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Series Overview
This China Maritime Report on Gwadar is the second in a series of case studies on China’s Indian
Ocean “strategic strongpoints” (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military
officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically
valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms.1
Each case study analyzes a different port on the Indian Ocean, selected to capture geographic,
commercial, and strategic variation.2 Each employs the same analytic method, drawing on Chinese
official sources, scholarship, and industry reporting to present a descriptive account of the port, its
transport infrastructure, the markets and resources it accesses, and its naval and military utility.
The case studies illuminate the various functions of overseas strategic strongpoint ports in China’s
Indian Ocean strategy. While the ports and associated infrastructure projects vary across key
characteristics, all ports share certain distinctive qualities: (1) strategic location, positioned astride
major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and/or near vital maritime chokepoints; (2) high-level
coordination among Chinese party-state officials, state-owned enterprises, and private firms; (3)
comprehensive commercial scope, including Chinese-led development of associated rail, road, and
pipeline infrastructure and efforts to promote trade, financing, industry, resource extraction, and
inland markets; and (4) potential or actual military utilization, with dual-use functions that can
enable both economic and military activities.
Ports are a key enabler for China’s economic, political, and potentially military expansion across the
globe. As China’s overseas economic activity grows, so too have demands on the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) to secure PRC citizens, investments, and supply lines abroad. Official PLA missions
now include “safeguarding the security of China’s overseas interests,”3 but “deficiencies in overseas
operations and support” persist.4 Yet with the notable exception of the sole overseas PLA Navy
(PLAN) base at Djibouti, all of the facilities examined in this series are ostensibly commercial.
Notably, the establishment of the Djibouti base followed many years of Chinese investment at the
adjacent commercial port and sustained attention into resources and markets inland.5
We should not assume that Djibouti is a model for other future bases. Instead, China’s strategic
strongpoint model should be understood as an evolving alternative to the familiar model of formal
overseas basing. With strongpoints, trade, investment, and diplomacy with the host country remain
the principal functions. However, the strongpoint creates conditions of possibility for the PLAN to
establish a network of supply, logistics, and intelligence hubs. We are already observing this nascent
network in operation across the Indian Ocean, and this series seeks to understand its key nodes.
1

For an overview of this concept, see Conor Kennedy, “Strategic Strongpoints and Chinese Naval Strategy.” Jamestown
Foundation China Brief 19, no. 6 (March 22, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-strong-points-and-chinesenaval-strategy/.
2
Future case studies include Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, and Dar es Salaam and
Bagamoyo in Tanzania. None of these other commercial port projects hosts any PLA military facilities to date, though
Chinese analysts discuss each as a potential strategic strongpoint.
3
PRC State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy (May 2015),
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm
4
PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era (July 2019),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. The section on “Protecting China’s Overseas Interests”
states that China “builds far seas forces, develops overseas logistical facilities, and enhances capabilities in accomplishing
diversified military tasks.”
5
See Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, “Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint,”
CMSI China Maritime Report No. 6 (April 2020), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/6/.

Summary
Gwadar is an inchoate “strategic strongpoint” in Pakistan that may one day serve as a major platform
for China’s economic, diplomatic, and military interactions across the northern Indian Ocean region.
As of August 2020, it is not a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base, but rather an underdeveloped
and underutilized commercial multipurpose port built and operated by Chinese companies in service
of broader PRC foreign and domestic policy objectives. Foremost among PRC objectives for Gwadar
are (1) to enable direct transport between China and the Indian Ocean, and (2) to anchor an effort to
stabilize western China by shoring up insecurity on its periphery. To understand these objectives, this
case study first analyzes the characteristics and functions of the port, then evaluates plans for
hinterland transport infrastructure connecting it to markets and resources. We then examine the
linkage between development in Pakistan and security in Xinjiang. Finally, we consider the military
potential of the Gwadar site, evaluating why it has not been utilized by the PLA then examining a
range of uses that the port complex may provide for Chinese naval operations.
Key Findings
• Chinese analysts view Gwadar as a top choice for establishing a new overseas strategic
strongpoint, owing to its prime geographic location and strong Sino-Pakistani ties. Many PLA
analysts consider Gwadar to be a suitable site for naval support.
• China’s interest in Gwadar—and in Pakistan’s economic development in general—does not
depend primarily on commercial returns. Instead, the Gwadar project is best understood as a
mode of strategic investment in China’s internal and external security.
• Externally, Gwadar’s principal strategic purpose for China is to become an “exit to the ocean”
(出海口)—that is, a direct route via Chinese infrastructure to secure reliable access to the
strategic space and resources of the northern Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
• Internally, Gwadar is an extension of China’s national security and development policies. Beijing
seeks to develop commercial linkages between western China, Pakistan, and Central Asia to
promote economic growth and thus manage perceived risks to social stability in Xinjiang.
• Extensive transport infrastructure is fundamental to China’s overall plans for Pakistan. Yet while
the planned transport corridor is often discussed as though it were operational, very little modern
infrastructure has been built beyond a few roads and the port itself.
• The inland markets and resources of Pakistan (and Afghanistan) present some commercial
prospects, but these have not yet borne fruit in part due to severe insecurity.
• Security measures may mitigate some risks to Chinese projects and personnel, but Gwadar and its
hinterlands are unlikely to be secure enough to become a major commercial entrepôt.
• Gwadar is not a PLA base, but it is used extensively by the Pakistan Navy (PN). The PN operates
frigates and patrol vessels bought from China and will also field Chinese-made submarines. Their
facilities, parts, and technicians may be readily employed for some of the PLAN fleet.
• Gwadar’s port facilities could support the PLAN’s largest vessels. Beyond the pier, Gwadar
possesses a sizeable laydown yard for marshalling military equipment and materials.
• Gwadar will not necessarily have utility as a base in a wartime scenario. The most critical factor
informing this view is the apparent lack of political commitment between China and Pakistan to
provide mutual military support during times of crisis or conflict.
• If the infrastructure projects mature, Gwadar could become a key peacetime replenishment or
transfer point for PLA equipment and personnel. Prepositioning parts, supplies, and other
materials at Gwadar would be a productive use of the port and airfield facilities.
2

Introduction
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been the chief promoter, financier, developer, manager,
and operator of the seaport at Gwadar since 2002.6 In October 2016, a decade after the port went into
operation, the first trade expedition traveled from China to Gwadar on a 15-day, 3,115 kilometer
(km) overland convoy from Xinjiang.7 The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, described this
elaborate exercise to export a modest 100 containers by truck as the “first movement in the ‘One Belt
One Road’ symphony, rich in romance.”8 There has not yet been a “second movement” of large-scale
transport from China to Gwadar, calling into question the heavily promoted idea of an economic
corridor from China to the Indian Ocean.
Partly due to its anemic commercial performance, some observers conclude Gwadar port is on the
verge of becoming “a new naval base in China’s string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean.9
Meanwhile, Chinese and Pakistani promoters claim that the dusty, isolated fishing town of 90,000
people is poised to become “a bustling city of two million people with a $30 billion GDP…and 1.2
million high paid jobs.”10 Neither scenario is likely. While senior Pakistani officials have reportedly
asked China to establish a Pakistani naval base at the site,11 China has taken a different tack. Chinese
leaders instead envision Gwadar’s development into an international transport hub, the centerpiece of
an ambitious bilateral economic and security program.
Chinese firms would need to bring about a wholesale transformation of Gwadar for it to flourish in
Pakistan’s remote and restive Balochistan province. Gwadar’s hinterlands are a sparsely populated,
poor region bordering comparable areas of Iran and Afghanistan. It is forbidding terrain, prone to
drought, flooding, and acute water and energy shortages, and plagued by labor unrest, terrorism, and
long-standing anti-government militancy.12 The area is potentially resource-rich, but almost totally
6

吴邦国副总理出席巴基斯坦瓜达尔港口项目一期工程开工典礼 [“Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo Attends the
Groundbreaking Ceremony of the First Phase of Gwadar Port Project in Pakistan”], PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
March 25, 2002,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676308/xgxw_676314/t5512.shtml.
7
郝洲, 周戎, 刘英 [Hao Zhou, Zhou Rong, and Liu Ying], 中巴经济走廊实地调研报告 [“China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor Field Research Report”], 人民大学重阳金融研究院与财经杂志报告 [Renmin University Chongyang Institute
and Caijing Magazine Report], no. 19 (December 2016), p. 6. (“Renmin/Caijing Report”)
8
中巴经济走廊树起“一带一路”样板 [“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Sets a Model for the Belt and Road”],” China
Industry & Commerce News [中华工商时报], January 6, 2017,
http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/fwydyl/zgzx/201701/20170102496988.shtml.
9
Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific,” CSIS
Briefs, April 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pakistans-gwadar-port-new-naval-base-chinas-string-pearls-indopacific.
10
Gwadar New Smart Port City Masterplan 2020, http://investment.cpicglobal.com/gwadar2020-brochure-bau-usgs?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7Kb9ipiV6QIVhZ6fCh1QPwNDEAAYASAAEgJ8RvD_BwE.
11
In 2011, visiting Beijing less than two weeks after the U.S. raid into Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden, Pakistan’s
Minister of Defense, Chaudhary Ahmed Mukhtar, told foreign media that “we have asked our Chinese brothers to please
build a naval base at Gwadar.” See Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,” Financial Times, May 22,
2011, https://www.ft.com/content/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0. Chinese media covered these comments,
declining to say whether or not Chinese leaders had agreed. See 外媒称巴基斯坦希望中国援建海军基地 [“Foreign
Media Say Pakistan Hopes China Will Help Build a Naval Base”],”新华网 [Xinhua Net], May 23, 2011,
http://news.cntv.cn/china/20110523/105539.shtml.
12
Frederic Grare, “Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (April 11,
2013), https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-state-versus-nation-pub-51488. A United Nations
Development Program report from 2017 noted that the situation is, if anything, deteriorating. “In Balochistan, 20 out of 24
districts, for which decade-old data is available, suffered a fall in their rankings [in the Human Development Index, a
composite indicator of standards of living].” Adil Najam and Faisal Bari, “Pakistan Human Development Index Report

3

lacking in industry and modern infrastructure to deliver its possible mineral wealth to market.13
Chinese analysts nonetheless continue to assert that “Gwadar is becoming ‘Shenzhen’ in Pakistan,”
hoping against all odds that Balochistan will reprise the economic miracles of China’s Pearl River
Delta.14
Thus far, commercial activity at Gwadar has been quite limited. The port has seen very little vessel
traffic in over a decade of operation, and its overland transport links remain tenuous. Nonetheless,
Chinese leadership continues to plow financial and political capital into this ambitious, long-term
enterprise. If it is unlikely to become a major economic hub, why is the Gwadar project still under
development? What are the motivations for continued Chinese interest and investment in the port and
surrounding infrastructure? How do Chinese leaders and experts understand the purpose of this
venture?
This case study focuses on China’s domestic discussion about Gwadar to understand why it remains
a desirable overseas strategic strongpoint for the PRC. There are two principal reasons, which
converge uniquely on Gwadar. The first is the port’s prized geostrategic location; the second is its
critical function in a broader Chinese program to develop Pakistan in order to better address China’s
domestic and regional security concerns. The evidence for these motivations emerges in the course of
the proceeding analysis, but both warrant brief exposition before analyzing the port complex itself.

2017,” United Nations Development Program Human Development Report, 2017,
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/HDR/HDI%20Report_2017.pdf. It is also the site of major shortfalls in
human resources, including poor health and education. See The World Bank, “Balochistan, Pakistan: Strengthening
Budget Management to Improve Education Service Delivery,” May 2018,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/872171540557541709/pdf/Balochistan-Strengthening-Budget-Managementto-Improve-Education-Service-Delivery.pdf.
13
Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan, “Draft Balochistan Comprehensive Development
Strategy (2013-2020),” United Nations Development Program Roadmap, 2013,
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/PROCUREMENT/2018/July%202018/2)%20BCDS%20Revised%20Fi
nal%20Draft%20August%2027%202013.pdf; Asian Development Bank, “Technical Assistance Islamic Republic of
Pakistan: Balochistan Economic Report,” ADB Technical Assistance, Project Number 39003, (December 2005),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/68721/39003-pak-tar.pdf; Azhar Ahmad, 瓜达尔—地区战略转
型中的平衡点 [Gwadar: Balance Point For a Region in Strategic Transition], trans. 李景峰, 史高杰 [Li Lingfeng and
Shi Gaojie], (Kunming: Yunnan University Press, 2017), p. 180.
14
季伟 [Li Wei], 瓜达尔正在成为巴基斯坦的“深圳” [“Gwadar Is Becoming Pakistan’s ‘Shenzhen’”], 新华网 [Xinhua
Net], August 28, 2018, http://m.xinhuanet.com/2018-08/28/c_1123340282.htm; 黄安芸, 杨超, 成奕霖 [Huang Anyun,
Yang Chao, and Cheng Yilin], [“Gwadar: From a ‘Small Fishing Village’ to the ‘Pearl’ of the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor”], 看看新闻 [KanKan News], May 19, 2017, http://www.kankanews.com/a/2017-05-19/0037996621.shtml
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Figure 1. A view of the Indian Ocean from China.15

Objective #1: An Exit to the Sea
China’s interest in Gwadar is dictated first by its strategic geography. Sited on Pakistan’s
southwestern Makran coastline, the port lies just 400 km east of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow
waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to global markets, and through which over 40 percent of
China’s imported oil transits.16 Iran is only 80 km to the west, and Gwadar’s home province of
Balochistan shares a long border with Afghanistan, some 500 km to the north of the port. Traveling
overland from Gwadar, China’s westernmost province of Xinjiang lies 1,800 km northeast over the
Karakorum mountain range. Pakistan also shares a 520 km border with Xinjiang, part of which is
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir disputed with India.
15

Map commissioned by CMSI, created by Andrew Rhodes. Blue lines show major shipping lanes, and red lines show
proposed economic corridors linking western China directly to the Indian Ocean. The reddish shaded areas along the SinoIndian borders designate disputed territory.
16
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, oil exports passing through the Strait of Hormuz average 21
million barrels/day, accounting for one third of globally traded oil. See “The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most
Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, June 20, 2019,
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932. The Chinese oil import figure (40.9 percent) comes from
researchers at Dalian Maritime University under grants from the PRC State Council (Ministry of Natural Resources and
Ministry of Education), Liaoning Province, and the Chinese Communist Party (Central Party Grant for Basic Research).
王爽 [Wang Shuang] et al., 瓜达尔港通航后的中国进口原油海运路径选择研究 [“Research on the Selection of Routes
for Maritime Transportation of Imported Crude Oil from Gwadar Port to China”],” 中国软科学 [China Soft Sciences], no.
5 (2018), p. 21.
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Because of this geography, Chinese strategists prize Gwadar as a strategic strongpoint in a vital
geopolitical region. It holds particular salience among China’s strongpoints for its role as an “exit to
the sea” (出海口) that links the Chinese mainland directly to the Indian Ocean.17 In this respect,
Gwadar differs significantly from the strategic strongpoint at Djibouti, the subject of the first case
study in this series. The Chinese presence at Djibouti expands the nation’s reach with a foothold on
the African continent, creating a military base from which to begin establishing exterior lines of
naval operations from the Chinese mainland across the Indian Ocean.18
Pakistan, by contrast, is on China’s immediate periphery and provides a rare channel of access to the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Pakistan and Myanmar are the only states other than India that are
contiguous to both Chinese territory and the Indian Ocean, and therefore have significant bearing
both on China’s peripheral security and its maritime access (see Figure 1).19 If overland road, rail,
and pipeline connections can be achieved, Chinese control over the port of Gwadar would anchor a
direct connection between Xinjiang and the Indian Ocean. Developing this infrastructure could
produce the first modern, multi-modal, continental line of operations—for commercial as well as
military purposes—from the ocean to the previously land-locked regions of western China.
Energy flows are a key component of this objective, which includes “entry” from the Indian Ocean
and Persian Gulf as well as “exit” from the Asian continent. Secure energy flows are vital to China’s
commercial and military objectives. Energy insecurity has long been an acute concern for Chinese
strategists, epitomized by the so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” or China’s reliance on shipping that
17

While the term translates directly to “estuary” and can be used for that technical purpose, it is also used in official and
scholarly discourse to mean a port for accessing the ocean. For example, a description of Pakistan as a strong point on the
Belt and Road by the PRC Ministry of Commerce frames the transport network through Pakistan as opening “an exit to the
Indian Ocean” (打开一个面向印度洋的出海口). See 六、巴基斯坦与 “一带一路” 的关系 [“Six, Pakistan’s
Relationship to the Belt and Road”], 商务历史 - 中华人民共和国商务部 [History of Commerce – PRC Ministry of
Commerce], Undated, http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?bandr=bjstyydyldgx, (accessed July 31, 2020); Former chairman of
Pakistan’s Board of Investment senator Saleem Mandviwalla explained to Chinese media that Xinjiang has gained an exit
to the sea that can save time and effort through an overland route to Gwadar. 观察: 中国在巴基斯坦为新疆打造出海口
[“Observer: China Creates an Exit to the Sea for Xinjiang in Pakistan”], BBC News – Chinese, April 21, 2015,
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2015/04/150421_ana_xi_pakistan. In official diplomatic exchanges, CPEC is
commonly referred to as an agreement between China and Pakistan on the construction of infrastructure between Xinjiang
in the north and the “Indian Ocean exit to the sea, Gwadar Port.” See: 各国大使谈两会: 世界将从中国改革中分享红利
[“Ambassadors Discuss the Two Sessions: The World Will Share the Dividends of China’s Reforms”], 新华网 [Xinhua],
March 5, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0305/c70731-24538827.html. For scholarly discussion of the term,
see 李靖宇 [Li Jingyu], et al, 关于中国在南亚区域选取印度洋出海口的战略推进构想 [“The Strategic Concept of
Selecting Points for China’s Access to the Indian Ocean in the South Asia Region”], 中国海洋大学学报 [Journal of
Ocean University of China], no. 5 (2012), pp. 29–39; 李鲁奇, 孔翔, 李一曼, 许杨 [Li Luqi, Kong Xiang, Li Yiman, and
Yang Xu], “一带一路”倡议下中国与中亚合作的战略支点选择 [“Selection of Strategic Strongpoints for China-Central
Asia Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative”], 地理研究 [Geographical Research] vol. 38, no. 7 (2019), pp.
1705-1719; 蔡晨宇[Cai Chenyu], 瓜达尔港的开发任重道远 [“The Development of Gwadar Port Has a Long Way to
Go”], 中国港口 [China Ports], no. 1 (2017), pp. 17–20; 刘新华 [Liu Xinhua], 力量场效应、瓜达尔港与中国的西印度
洋利益 [“Force Field Effect: Gwadar Port and China’s Western Indian Ocean Interests”], 世界经济与政治论坛 [World
Economics and Politics], vol. 53, no. 5 (2013), pp. 1–18.
18
On China’s interior/exterior lines, see Peter Dutton, “A Maritime or Continental Order for Southeast Asia and the South
China Sea,” Naval War College Review, vol. 69, no. 3 (2016), pp. 5-13.
19
Kyaukphyu in Myanmar (the subject of a forthcoming CMSI China Maritime Report case study) is often discussed as
the other alternative “exit to the sea” for China to the Indian Ocean. Some analysts include ports in Bangladesh
(Chittagong in particular) as also serving this function, though Chinese access to these ports would necessarily traverse
India—including territory disputed between China and India in Arunachal Pradesh. See Li Jingyu, et al, “The Strategic
Concept of Selecting Points.”
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might be interdicted on its way through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean.20 Overland
transport from China to Gwadar can ostensibly “shed 85 percent of the distance of sea-only
transport,”21 and avoid Malacca altogether. If sufficient Chinese maritime power can be projected
into Hormuz, as leading civilian transport officials have proposed, a new and secure energy route
appears possible.22 Creating an alternative, protected channel for flows of vital resources and trade
could reduce China’s vulnerability to disruptions from foreign maritime powers, piracy, natural
disasters, and other shocks to maritime transportation. The confluence of land and sea access to the
greater Middle East afforded by Pakistan is unique and could be strategically significant.

Figure 2. Gwadar-Xinjiang connection23

20

There is some discussion in China as to whether this is an entirely rational concern, but the concept remains prevalent.
For a well-informed discussion of it, see 薛力 [Xue Li], 马六甲困境"内涵辨析与中国的应对 [“Analysis of the Content
of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and China’s Response”],” 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], no. 10 (2010), pp.
117–140. For analysis specific to Gwadar, see 梅新育 [Mei Xinyu], 瓜达尔港与中国能源进口 [“Gwadar Port and
China’s Energy Imports”], 财经杂志 [Caijing Magazine], December 20, 2016,
http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20161220/4214477.shtml.
21
A February 2015 report stating that China would imminently enjoy an 85 percent reduction in transit distance for
imported oil garnered great attention on Chinese social media. 巴基斯坦第三大港口 4 月运营我国石油运输线缩短 85%
[“Pakistan’s Third Largest Port Will Go Into Operation in April, Reducing the Transit Distance of Chinese Oil by 85%”],
新浪财经 [Sina Finance], February 21, 2015, https://finance.sina.cn/chanjing/gdxw/2015-02-21/detailicczmvun6226180.d.html?from=wap; see also later skeptical commentary on it by a researcher from the PRC Ministry of
Commerce (Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation): 梅新育 [Mei Xinyu], 中巴油气管线构
想 深陷经济安全误区 [“The Concept of China-Pakistan Oil and Gas Pipelines is Deeply Trapped in Misconceptions
About Economic Security”] 第一财经日报 [First Financial Daily], August 18, 2015,
https://www.yicai.com/news/4671232.html; 蔡晨宇[Cai Chenyu], 瓜达尔港的开发任重道远 [“The Development of
Gwadar Port Has a Long Way to Go”], 中国港口 [China Ports], no. 1 (2017), p. 17.
22
Song Dexing, Director of the Water Transportation Bureau at the PRC Ministry of Transport, calls for “improved
maritime power and influence in the Strait [of Hormuz].” See 史春林, 李秀英 [Shi Chunlin and Li Xiuying], 霍尔姆斯海
峡安全对中国进口石油供应和运输影响 [“The Impact of the Security of the Strait of Hormuz on China’s Imported Oil
Supply and Shipping”],” 中国软科学 [China Soft Sciences], no. 7 (2013), p. 15.
23
“一带一路”期间与标杆—中巴经济走廊 [“‘One Belt One Road’ Flagship and Model—China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor”], 新华网思客 [Xinhua Net Thinker], archived June 17, 2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200617213149/http://sike.news.cn/hot/1705cpec/index.html
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Objective #2: Shoring Up Peripheral Security and Stability
Gwadar is also a key instrument for advancing Beijing’s interest in a secure and stable Pakistan. This
interest has both foreign and domestic security policy drivers, arising from the states’ contiguous
border regions of Xinjiang, in China, and Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (i.e.,
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is disputed by India). This complex and unresolved border
thus implicates both China’s long-standing internal campaign to stamp out “separatism, terrorism,
and extremism” in its ethnic minority western regions, and its external objective to keep India
strategically focused on Pakistan.24
These enduring interests make Pakistan a high priority for Chinese leaders, who routinely reaffirm
the bilateral relationship in hyperbolic terms.25 Pakistan is perennially China’s largest armspurchaser, and owes much of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities to the PRC.26 Since China’s
border war with India in 1962, the Sino-Pakistani entente has functioned largely as a check on Indian
power in the region, emphasizing military and intelligence cooperation, with mostly solid diplomatic
support.27 This basic logic still obtains, but China’s broader regional objectives have led it to pursue
a greatly augmented economic dimension to the relationship.
Beginning in 2013, Chinese and Pakistani leaders announced that Gwadar port would be the
centerpiece of the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) (中巴经济走廊).28 Chinese
planners envision the port as the oceanic node of a transportation network of road, rail, and pipeline
infrastructure intended to traverse over 3,000 km of rugged, often insecure Pakistani terrain to link up
with Chinese transport networks in Xinjiang province. From a northern terminus at Kashgar in
western Xinjiang, goods conveyed from Gwadar can then, in theory, proceed on to massive PRC
markets further east, and vice versa. Landlocked central Asian states—Afghanistan in particular—are
among the intended beneficiaries of this aspirational transport system.29 Gwadar port is now heralded

24

See Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015); Isaac Kardon, “China and Pakistan:
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25
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the People’s Republic of China, November 24, 2006,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2757_663518/2758_663520/t285
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September 8, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/08/c_137454716.htm.
26
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Recently, China declined to defend Pakistan against its listing on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list” of
countries needing to control financing for terrorism. Adnan Aamir, “The Grey List: More Trouble for Pakistan’s
Economy,” The Lowy Institute Interpreter, July 18, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/grey-list-moretrouble-pakistan-s-economy
28
“Li Keqiang Urges Development of ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’,” South China Morning Post, May 23, 2013,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1244267/li-keqiang-urges-development-china-pakistan-economic-corridor
29
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“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Field Research Report,” p. 3. See also 唐孟生 [Tang Mengsheng], 唐孟生谈中巴经
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Benchmark”], Sina, May 26, 2016, http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2016-05-26/doc-ifxsqxxu4430007.shtml.

8

as “the second great monument of Pak-China friendship after the Karakorum Highway,” the high
mountain road that connects the two countries.30
China’s senior leadership has staked considerable capital and credibility on the success of Gwadar.
During Xi Jinping’s April 2015 visit to Pakistan, he elevated CPEC to the highest priority and
“flagship” of his “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI).31 Xi named Gwadar as one of the four pillars of
CPEC, and pledged $46 billion in Chinese investment over the next 15 years.32 This largesse is a
major departure from China’s long-standing economic neglect of Pakistan.33 The huge and growing
outlay of promised PRC investment in CPEC is estimated at as much as $87 billion, 34 though only
$28.6 billion is allocated as of the latest official tally.35 Whatever the ultimate figure, it is not a trivial
sum. Chinese leaders have opted for a strong dose of economic engagement to shore up this
important relationship for the new era. Direct investment at Gwadar is estimated to be $1.62 billion
to date, constituting a small but significant proportion of the PRC’s CPEC program.36 As the key
project in Xi’s signature international program, Gwadar’s development holds immense symbolic as
well as practical value for Chinese foreign policy.
These huge investments are necessary, in PRC leadership’s estimation, because of Pakistan’s dire
social and economic weakness. Xi has pledged a Chinese “blood transfusion” to shore up Pakistani
instability.37 This medical metaphor is also used within China to describe the “disease” of Uyghur
30

Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs, “Year Book 2016-2017,” Islamabad, 2018,
http://moma.gov.pk/userfiles1/file/YB_2016-17.pdf, p. 51
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32
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he outlined four main lines of effort for CPEC: expanding Gwadar port and its free zone, constructing energy projects,
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Delivered Keynote Speech”] 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], May 14, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201705/14/content_5193673.htm#allContent
33
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34
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Muslim separatism.38 Chinese analysts describe the connection of the port to China as “a large
artery” supporting Pakistan’s health—and China’s, too.39 Such emphasis on the basic unity of
internal and external security reflects Xi Jinping’s conception of “holistic national security,” rooted
in long-standing Chinese strategic thinking about its western frontiers.40 According to the former
PRC Ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin, the CPEC program “will improve the economic and social
development of the backward areas of Pakistan and China. The situation provides a ‘cure’ for the
terrorist threat in the region.”41
Chinese rulers have long viewed economic development along China’s western periphery as a means
to maintain stability. General Liu Yazhou, political commissar of the PLA National Defense
University, captured this long-standing conception of China’s near abroad, stating that “we should
see the western regions not as a frontier but rather as our advancing hinterlands.”42 From this
perspective, Pakistan is part of the same socio-economic and security system as Xinjiang. Chinese
security leadership considers instability in Pakistan to be a significant threat to PRC domestic
stability, in large part because of its close connections to Xinjiang.43 As the People’s Armed Police
(PAP) Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Qin Tian put it, “the trend of foreign terrorists returning to
the country is obvious. Xinjiang is under attack.”44 Chinese analysts consider Pakistan a major vector
for radicalization of Chinese Muslims. Beijing has thus long relied on Pakistan to “mediate major
elements of its counter-terrorism policy.”45
The economic program of CPEC (of which Gwadar is a component) is best understood then as an
instrument of Beijing’s security policy. The aim is to stabilize and pacify Xinjiang by integrating its
development with countries on China’s periphery. The development of an Indian Ocean port is
fundamental to the overarching goal of internal stability and peripheral security. To understand why
and how first requires an understanding of the port and its connecting infrastructure.
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Image 1: Gwadar Bay with Port inset46

Image 2: Gwadar Port and Surrounds47

46
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Port Capacity & Characteristics
The port at Gwadar has been in operation since 2008 but has yet to see regular commercial service.
Situated in the east bay of a hammer-shaped peninsula, it has historically supported artisanal fishing
for the local population. That population has not yet been displaced by the industrial-scale
commercial port operation intended by the project developers. Indeed, Gwadar port’s commercial
throughput is not yet reported by any major industry sources. The port and its adjacent free trade and
export processing zone nonetheless continue as the subjects of voluminous reporting in Pakistani and
Chinese media while incremental upgrades and expansions take place.
Port Development
The dream of a deep-water port at Gwadar has been long in the making. A survey by the United
States Geological Service in 1954 demonstrated the suitability of the site’s natural harbor for
development as a port, after which Pakistan negotiated the purchase of the Gwadar site from the
Sultanate of Oman for $3 million in 1958.48 Pakistani officials marketed the prospective port at
Gwadar to foreign firms throughout the intervening decades, and nearly reached a deal in the late
1990s with the U.S. oil and gas firm Unocal, which reportedly aimed to use Gwadar as hub for
natural gas pipelines spanning the region.49 Pakistani leaders were unable to secure capital and
technical expertise for the port’s development until August 2001, when PRC Prime Minister Zhu
Rongji committed Chinese support for the project.50
The China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC)51 was the general contractor on the initial
development of the site, breaking ground in March 2002.52 CHEC inherited a design from a British
firm, but opted to redesign “in line with Chinese port construction standards,” according to the
general manager and chief engineer of the project, Sun Ziyu, who noted that it was “built to
specifications 70 percent higher than the standards of the United Kingdom.”53 Sun claimed that they
were not the low bidder, but rather offered the highest quality project (though there is no public
record of open bidding on the project).54 One strength of the Chinese bid was the financial backing of
state. The leading PRC policy bank supporting overseas construction, China’s Export Import Bank
(Exim Bank), financed the port construction project with a $50 million grant, a $50 commercial
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credit, and a $98 million state credit repayable over 15 years, with Pakistan providing the remaining
$50 million for the $248 million project.55
The project faced significant security and technical challenges, including fatal terrorist attacks
against the Chinese engineers and laborers working on site.56 Lacking fresh water, reliable electricity,
and modern roads, the Chinese laborers also made do with infrequent shipments from the PRC;
project equipment came in on a semi-submersible barge from the mainland because it could not be
conveyed overland.57 These threats and obstacles notwithstanding, CHEC completed Phase I of
construction in the spring of 2007, three months ahead of schedule, but $50 million over budget.58
The facility features a 4.7 km approach channel dredged to a depth of 14.5 meters (m), with a turning
basin with a maximum allowable length overall (LOA) of 295m.59 The 602m continuous quay wall
includes three 200m multipurpose ship berths that can accommodate up to 50,000 DWT vessels with
a maximum 12.5m draught.60 The cargo berths are outfitted for container, RO-RO, breakbulk, and
heavy project cargo; a 100m service berth is immediately west of the quay.61 The designed capacity
is 137,000 TEU (containerized cargo) per year, and 868,000 tons of general and bulk cargo per
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year.62 These are the modest port facilities currently operating, with only minor augmentation well
over a decade later.
Port Management
The Gwadar Port Authority tendered international bids in 2006, and the Port of Singapore Authority
(PSA) won a 40-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) lease for Gwadar port in 2007.63 CHEC and
Dubai Ports World also bid on the project, but PSA was awarded the concession on the strength of its
reputation as a leading global port operator.64 Under the agreement, PSA was to receive 91 percent of
cargo operations revenues and 85 percent of the free zone revenues.65 As part of this concession, PSA
agreed to develop Phase II of the port, pledging a $550 million investment in the construction of four
additional container berths, a bulk cargo terminal, two oil terminals, a roll-on roll-off terminal, and a
grain terminal over the next five years.66 Stymied by political, engineering, and legal obstacles, PSA
failed to implement Phase II expansion.67 The port was only utilized for bulk cargos of fertilizer,
urea, and wheat imported directly by the government-operated Trading Corporation of Pakistan,
which had to subsidize these transactions.68 In 2011, PSA entered negotiations to exit the project.
By February 2013, PSA had opted to sell all of its equity in the port to the Chinese state-owned firm
China Overseas Port Holdings Company, Ltd. (COPHC).69 When COPHC took over the port from
PSA in February 2013, the facilities were in disrepair. Engineers from the China Communications
Construction Corporation-Fourth Harbor Engineering Investigation and Design Institute Co., Ltd.
(CCCC-FHDI, which was involved in the survey and planning of the port’s construction from 20022007) assessed the port after the Chinese take-over and found the main pier in sound structural
condition, but almost everything else had been neglected and was in various stages of decay. The
approach had silted up to only 12.1 meters (from 14.5 m), steel components of the loading equipment
and cranes were “severely corroded,” quay crane hydraulic systems were leaking, and yard
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equipment “urgently needed maintenance.”70 As late as 2016, the port’s cargo-handling equipment
was reportedly unusable due to neglect; oil storage tanks were rusted over and non-functional, and
“mountains of garbage filled the port area.”71 Still, shortly after Xi Jinping’s landmark trip and
announcement of the CPEC project, COPHC finalized a new 40-year lease on the Gwadar port in
November 2015.72
COPHC had no prior experience owning or operating a port terminal before taking over at Gwadar.73
Indeed, the firm was incorporated and registered (in Hong Kong) in August 2012.74 According to
COPHC’s chairman, Zhang Baozhong, the firm “was specially-designed and purposely-built…for
Gwadar port by the Chinese government.”75 Disclosures to the Hong Kong Exchange where the firm
is domiciled describe it as a private corporation in which Zhang himself owns one third of the issued
shares (worth only $500,000 USD).76 The firm is otherwise opaque, and unwilling to respond to
Pakistani journalists’ requests for further information.77 Public documents do not list any identifiable
government actors in the firm’s management or ownership structure.78 Nonetheless, the “stateowned” status of the port operator appears to be a selling point for developments surrounding
Gwadar, indicating a degree of PRC government commitment, perhaps intended to assure investors.79
This lease reportedly replicates the arrangements of the earlier PSA deal, with 91 percent of port
revenues allotted to COPHC, 9 percent to the federal Pakistani government, and nothing to the
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Baloch provincial government.80 The COPHC lease also retains all of the PSA-negotiated
arrangements and preferential conditions—“even PSA’s corporate structure for operation and
management of ports and free zones—we have copied them intact,” according to a COPHC executive
in Pakistan.81 PSA is among the leading global terminal operators, and has had the world’s highest
throughput of containers through its terminals since 2008.82 Yet this world-class firm was unable (or
unwilling) to successfully bring the port into commercial operation, calling into question the business
case for COPHC’s subsequent efforts.
Port Utilization
Commercial activity at Gwadar has been quite limited, as of June 2020. While industry reporting
does not cover throughput or utilization at the port, available evidence makes clear it is operating
well below its designed capacity. According to the Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs, cargo
throughput actually decreased after COPHC took over the lease in 2013. Only 1.42 million tons of
cargo and 99 ships came through Gwadar in the entire five years from 2013-2017 (the last time
throughput was officially reported).83 By contrast, in the second year of the port’s operation under
PSA in 2009, a total of 2.25 million tons of cargo were imported through Gwadar by 70 ships. The
port has generated only $2.26 million in revenues during the period since the COPHC takeover in
2013, and only about $200,000 went to the Gwadar Port Authority, according to reports from the
Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs in spring 2019.84
“Most of the time,” wrote a Chinese industry analyst in 2017, “Gwadar port is basically idle.”85 In
the early years of COPHC operation, industry analysts described the problem at Gwadar as “ships but
no cargo, or cargo but no ships.”86 Three years after assuming control of the port, the Chinese
operator handled its first commercial cargo vessel: the Sinotrans Shipping bulk carrier Changhang
Hanhai, which offloaded 30,000 tons of engineering equipment and building materials at berth 2 in
October 2016.87 This limited activity consisted primarily of cargo for construction on the port and its
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surrounding facilities.88 Cargo throughput for import was not yet economically feasible. Engineers
from CCC-FHDI reported in 2017 that cargo passing through Gwadar port required government
subsidies of twenty USD per ton.89
Actual commercial utilization began in 2018, when COPHC and COSCO announced the start of a
regular container service. The MS TIGER arrived at Gwadar on March 7, 2018, accompanied by two
Pakistani naval vessels and much fanfare.90 The vessel subsequently loaded an undisclosed number
of frozen seafood containers and left for Jebel Ali, UAE that same day. This “Karachi-Gwadar
Express Service” was intended to run every Wednesday. However, according to COSCO logs online,
the service ceased after only 9 such transits, in May 2018.91
Limited equipment upgrades have improved the handling capacity at the port. Three new quay cranes
arrived mid-July 2018.92 These quay cranes have permitted the modest uptick in the frequency of
ship visits, including for dry bulk items for which the cranes are well-suited.93 In 2019, seven
container vessels visited Gwadar; as of May 2020, three container vessels, two bulk vessels, and one
liquid petroleum gas (LPG) carrier have called on the port, though there is no LPG terminal. Still,
CCDI-FHDI engineers reported in 2019 that “due to the lack of specialized coal, ore, container, oil
and gas berths in Gwadar port, the types of cargo handled are relatively simple. The role assumed in
Pakistan's maritime trade is not yet prominent.”94
The COSCO container service appears to have been resuscitated in early 2020,95 though firm
representatives say the line often skips Gwadar.96 Throughput may improve marginally as enterprises
begin operating out of the initial section of the free zone, but full utilization of the port is not on the
horizon.
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Image 3: Gwadar Port and Free Zone, April 202097

Free Zone Development
The port is designed to incorporate an adjacent free trade and export processing zone modeled on
Shekou, the port complex at the heart of the PRC’s Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.98 The basic
“Shekou Model” (蛇口模式) is a port surrounded by a logistics and free trade zone, and bolstered by
a purpose-built commercial and residential city to support the work-force for the whole complex.
This “port-park-city” is designed to reproduce a thriving, Chinese business ecosystem that can
generate and process the trade required to make the port and its hinterlands prosper.99 Like Shenzhen,
Gwadar’s development begins from humble origins as a fishing village.100 While Gwadar is plainly
lacking most of the other crucial ingredients that make Shenzhen the economic miracle that it is,
Chinese firms are nonetheless advocating a similar approach there.101
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The free zone is conceived as an integral part of the overall port project. COPHC secured a 43-year
lease in 2015 to develop a 2,281-acre tax-free industrial, logistics, warehousing, and export zone
north of the port, called the “Gwadar Free Zone.”102 It is operated by a COPHC subsidiary, Gwadar
Free Zone Company, which intends to interface between Chinese firms and the local government,
while providing utilities and security for the site.103 Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Shahid Abbasi
presided over the inauguration of Phase I of this project in January 2018, a 60-acre initial commercial
logistics zone on the western flank of the existing port facility.
The zone is meant to attract Chinese and Pakistani firms to the port. COPHC’s chairman, Zhang
Baozhong, claims thirty-plus Chinese and Pakistani firms have already invested nearly $500 million
to use the facilities. COPHC posted an online investment guide with all of the registration procedures
required for operating in the free zone, meant to attract Chinese firms and streamline the process for
getting into the Pakistani market.104 Incentives include the possibility of 100 percent ownership for
foreign investors, a 23-year tax holiday on any revenues from operations in the zone, 99-year landleases, duty-free imports and exports, a “world-class infrastructure and security arrangement,” and
other promised business perks like flexible visas and ready-to-use office, industrial, and warehousing
space.105
The PRC Embassy in Islamabad reports that a wide range of state-owned and private firms, both
Chinese and Pakistani, have submitted applications to become free zone companies.106 Among them
are the Shandong Linyi Overseas Investment Company, which has begun preparatory work on a trade
exhibition hall and commercial logistics park.107 Some large state-owned enterprises are involved at
the Gwadar free zone, including the China Merchants Group and China Communications
Construction Corp., but most of the contracts have reportedly gone to smaller local SOEs and private
firms.108
In January 2018, the Gwadar Free Zone desalination facility entered operation.109 After upgrades, the
plant now processes 220,000 gallons per day. 110 Chinese sources claim the plant’s water supply and
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drainage system will support not only the port complex, but also parts of the surrounding community,
which is plagued by persistent water shortages.111 Other efforts around the Gwadar Free Zone include
schools, hospitals, and commercial and residential real estate.112
Although the free zone intends to foster new industries, the long-standing fisheries industry was the
first to attract Chinese investment and trading activity at the port. A Xinjiang-based fishing company,
Yufei International Fishing Company, invested in building a fish processing and cold-storage center,
kicking off construction in the initial section of the free zone in May 2017.113 The firm plans to ship
frozen seafood from Gwadar in reefer containers and truck it over the roughly ten-day, 1,800-km
route through the Khunjerab Pass into Xinjiang Province.114 Western China got its “first taste of the
Indian Ocean” at a promotional event for Gwadar’s seafood in Karamay, Xinjiang on May 20, 2017.
For this event, however, Yufei flew two tons of seafood from Gwadar to Urumqi via Karachi and
Beijing, arriving on Karamay citizens’ tables 34 hours later.115 There is no subsequent reporting on
overland transport of Gwadar fish, though the container service has exported it to regional markets.116
Phase II and Beyond
Phase II expansions to the port and free zone are planned, but little progress is evident. One common
sentiment among Chinese analysts is that the infrastructure must precede the commercial activity. In
the words of an economics reporter who led a major study of the port: “in the longer term, when
China lays out the basic infrastructure, it needs more participants to form a self-operating economic
ecology. Relying solely on China’s unilateral blood transfusions is unsustainable. If you want to
attract more foreign investors, you need to take your time and wait for Pakistan’s economic
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fundamentals to be revitalized.”117 The medical metaphor of Pakistan as a sick patient is indicative of
some of the socio-economic and security concerns that have hampered expeditious development at
the port and free zone.

Figure 3. Gwadar city master plan118

Phase II plans include a further nine berths to the east of the existing multipurpose berths, including a
container terminal with four berths, a grain terminal, a bulk terminal, and two oil terminals on the
northeast of the bay.119 COPHC has submitted a proposal to construct the breakwaters needed to
carry out this expansion, but the business plan remains under review by the Pakistan Ministry of
Ports and Security.120 Indeed, reviews and approvals from Pakistani officials have been a source of
major frustration for COPHC, which all but begged for support from Pakistan’s Federal Board of
Revenue in a recent presentation at the PRC Embassy in Islamabad.121
Trade is hampered by customs regulations that thus far have limited imports to only 20 specified
items. Pakistan’s bureaucracy also has a complicated licensing system for potential investors in the
free zone, such that only 12 of the 30 registered investors had been licensed (as of the last report in
October 2018).122 COPHC noted that these are among the obstacles “involved in non-operation of
Gwadar Port for commercial purposes” and claim that desired actions by Pakistani officials will
117
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allow the “operationalization of Gwadar Port.”123
The natural sedimentation of the port means that continuous dredging is required for sufficient depth
to be maintained for larger vessels to call.124 Officially, a COPHC bid to conduct further dredging of
channels and berths is under review by the Pakistan Ministry of Ports and Shipping and the Gwadar
Port Authority.125 No contract has yet been publicized, but maintenance dredging occurs periodically
in order to maintain the current depth and provide landfill for port projects.126 Recent channel
dredging observed in Spring of 2019 is reportedly being done for construction of the East Bay
Expressway.127 A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson publicized this dredging
activity, noting that it was conducted by one of the vessels involved in China’s land reclamation in
the disputed Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, the M/V Tian Bai owned by CCCC subsidiary
Tianjin Dredging Company.128 One Chinese analyst claims COSCO would begin to operate more
regularly out of Gwadar if vessels larger than the current maximum of 50,000 DWT (Handymax)
could use the facility.129 Given the low utilization of the port at present, it is hardly certain that larger
ships would call even with adequate facilities.
Satellite imagery shows signs of new construction occurring adjacent to the port, with current focus
on roadways and storage laydown areas. Most observed construction appears to be focused on land
preparation, roads, piping, and structures of the initial section of the free zone. Substantial land
reclamation must be completed before work on much of the other infrastructure can even be initiated.
The land on which planners envision the secondary container terminal, the grain and bulk terminals,
and the oil terminal, does not yet exist. Continued dredging and deepening of the approach channel
could provide some of the landfill for such reclamation.130
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Competition from Other Ports
Pakistan already has two large ports in a major urban area, relatively well-connected to their
hinterland, that are also being actively expanded by Chinese firms: Karachi and Port Muhammad Bin
Qasim (Port Qasim). Virtually all maritime trade in Pakistan goes through Karachi or Qasim, some
600 km to the east in relatively prosperous Punjab province.131 Commercial data providers still do not
bother reporting statistics on Gwadar’s throughput, because according to engineers from CCCCFHDI, Gwadar’s cargos account for less than one percent of the roughly 100 million tons of annual
throughput in Pakistani ports in recent years.132 Yet despite its underutilization to date, the project’s
backers claim Gwadar will handle a staggering 300 million to 400 million tons annually once all
phases of construction are complete by 2030.133
Sited in the largest Pakistani city by population, Karachi’s port is the nation’s principle maritime
trade link. The second most active hub is Port Qasim, which is 35 km east of Karachi city but
sometimes considered to be a part of the Karachi port complex. Both are linked up with Pakistan’s
rail and road system on the better developed eastern side of the country. The Gwadar Port Authority
and Chinese engineers promote Gwadar as a response to growing demand and lack of space for
Karachi’s future expansion, and the geographic disadvantages of Qasim.134
The claim that these established ports cannot expand to meet capacity demand, however, is belied by
Chinese firms’ active pursuit of expansion at both sites. Chinese firms have recently pursued a
container terminal expansion at Karachi (beginning 2019)135 and the construction under CPEC of two
660 mW coal-fired power plants and a coal-berth at Port Qasim (begun 2015, made operational in
2017 and 2018).136 Bidding for a floating LNG terminal expansion project at Qasim is open and
attracting international bids.137 Qasim and Karachi are actively under development and evidently still
present a value proposition for Chinese and other foreign firms.
If Gwadar has any competitive advantages over these established facilities, they lie in the PRC’s
intimate connections to Pakistan. Its success will depend on the distinctive characteristics of China’s
strategic strongpoints—particularly the coordinated efforts of the Chinese party-state and business
enterprises to realize their comprehensive development goals. For Gwadar to thrive, it will depend on
131
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robust transport networks that link it to markets and resources. Functional road, rail, air, and pipeline
infrastructure are essential to expanding the hinterland served by the port.

Transport Infrastructure
The promise of a direct commercial connection between the Indian Ocean and Xinjiang province has
fixated Chinese leaders and analysts—especially as a means of circumventing the much-hyped
“Malacca Dilemma.”138 But the Balochistan hinterlands are sparsely populated and barely developed,
making it essential to develop modern transport links to convey goods and natural resources between
the port and more substantial inland markets.139 Progress in constructing transport infrastructure
providing connectivity to the port has been halting. Nearby the port, the obstacles to infrastructure
development include poor power and water supply, difficulty in securing permits and support from
local government, persistent terrorist attacks on projects and personnel, and difficulty securing
capital given those risks and continued non-performance of the port itself.140 Further afield, it is the
engineering challenges that loom large, especially as the terrain climbs the Himalayan plateau in
Pakistan’s north and east and crosses the Khunjerab Pass in order to connect to PRC rail, road, and
pipeline networks.
Work to date has yet to meaningfully connect the port to inland transport networks. Instead, CPEC
construction has largely focused on “early harvest” projects that prioritize power generation. A
CPEC “Joint Commission” consisting of government and commercial actors from both sides was
established in August 2013.141 Its biannual meetings have led to a prioritization on energy generation
and transmission. Power plants, mostly coal, and related infrastructure have largely been constructed
along the already better-developed central and eastern corridors, rather than the western corridor
traversing Balochistan.142
Gwadar and its hinterlands have been neglected in favor of the relatively better-off and more
developed eastern portions of the country, Punjab and Sindh. This prioritization largely reflects
political goals of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (2013-2017), who ran on a platform of ending
power blackouts (his slogan was “Bright Pakistan”).143 Sharif initiated CPEC with a vision of
leveraging Chinese firms’ extraordinary capacity in coal power generation. This prioritization of the
program differs from that of his successor, Imran Khan, who has shown more interest in industrial
138
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parks than power plants.144 The following section summarizes the limited progress to date in
connecting Gwadar to road, rail, air, and pipeline networks.
Road Networks
The most immediate priority for Gwadar’s connectivity is the construction of a road that links the
port to Pakistan’s highway system. Pakistan’s national highway system also requires upgrades and
expansion to connect it to Chinese road networks in Xinjiang, and to the wider Central Asian region.
At present, there are only two roads connecting Gwadar to Pakistan’s road network: the Makran
Coastal Highway (N-10) that runs east toward Karachi and west to the Iranian border, and the
incomplete M-8 highway, which runs north-east toward Sindh and Punjab. Neither provides
sufficient land transport capacity or range to support a thriving gateway port at Gwadar.

Figure 4. Official CPEC roadways map145

At present, the only thoroughfare connecting the port to other roads is a 16-foot wide local road lined
by restaurants, mosques, and food stalls.146 This is not a viable route for trucks serving the port. After
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land reclamation and construction along Gwadar’s east bay (currently underway), this route will be
replaced by a 6-lane expressway. The planned “East-Bay Expressway” is intended to connect the port
area to the M-8 highway and N-10 arteries that connect Gwadar to the rest of the country. The CCCC
broke ground on this project in November 2017,147 and landfill on the east side of the peninsula can
be seen on satellite imagery. The project has been repeatedly paused, however, and may be forced to
reroute due to protests by local fishermen whose livelihoods will be upset by the highway cutting off
access to their fishing pier.148 Completion of an expressway that will circumvent that route is now
projected for October 2020.
Gwadar is thus in the process of being connected to Pakistan’s highway system. However, for
Pakistan’s highways to provide a “corridor” connecting the port to western China, substantial road
works are required elsewhere in the country. In particular, the linchpin of the China-Pakistan
overland connection is the Karakorum Highway (KKH) in the northeast of the country. It long
predates CPEC and is sometimes referred to as the “China-Pakistan Friendship Highway,” because it
was jointly constructed and is the only road link between the two countries. Construction began in
1959, and Chinese engineers and workers were instrumental throughout the 27 years it took to build
this “Eighth Wonder of the World,” so dubbed because it traverses some of the most treacherous
terrain on the planet (and reportedly cost the lives of 800 workers).149
The KKH runs 1,300 km, from Hasan Abdal in Punjab province and passes through Gilgit-Baltistan
before traversing the highest mountain pass in the world (the Khunjerab Pass, over 4,500 meters
elevation) and terminating in Xinjiang. It is another 420 km along China National Highway 314 to
the first Chinese city, Kashgar. The mountainous sections of the route are only passable several
months a year, depending on conditions, and major landslides, avalanches, and earthquakes often
render it impassable even during the warm season.150 Since an MOU was signed between the two
governments in 2008, Chinese firms funded by China Export-Import Bank loans have been working
to expand the road from 10 to 30m in width to triple its transport capacity.151 But natural disasters
have limited progress to date. A landslide in the Hunza Valley in January 2010 created a massive
lake covering more than 20km of the road. After several years of trying to repair the road, the CBRC
147
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opted to reroute it in 2012 and completed a new road and series of tunnels circumnavigating the lake
in September 2015.152 Plans to re-establish the original route have been permanently shelved.153
Elements of the KKH have been upgraded, with a spur from Thakot to Havelian in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province “substantially completed” by CCCC in March 2020. Another spur running
136 km from Thakot to Raikot in Gilgit Baltistan is still undergoing a “feasibility study for
realignment,” reflecting both engineering and bureaucratic challenges facing this high mountain
route.154 Pakistani planners claim they are searching for “financially viable road projects and schemes
in less developed areas,” including “the western route of CPEC [to Balochistan and Gwadar],” but
allocation of funding still skews towards the more developed east of the country.155
Despite slow progress in road construction, China’s third largest truck manufacturer, state-owned
China National Heavy Duty Truck Group Co., Ltd. (Sinotruk), signed a strategic cooperation
framework agreement with COPHC and Gwadar’s port authority in August 2017.156 Heavy trucking
industries will be critical to ongoing construction and transport, particularly in the absence of railway
links to the port at Gwadar.
Railroad Networks
Gwadar is not yet connected to Pakistan’s rail networks. Technical studies on Gwadar’s viability as a
port hinge on successful development of links to inland railroads, which are concentrated in the east
of the country.157 China, which has laid more domestic high-speed rail line than any other nation in
history, has a direct interest in improved rail systems,158 since the continental portion of its Belt and
Road Initiative hinges on extensive rail connectivity throughout Eurasia.159 The rail network in
Xinjiang is comparatively well-developed and could easily facilitate access to the wider Chinese
market once rail connectivity to the port of Gwadar is completed.160

152

Asghar Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, “KKH Realighnment: 94% work on the project completed so far, remaining to be
completed by Sep. 25 this year: Pamir Times, June 27, 2015, https://pamirtimes.net/2015/06/27/kkh-re-alignment-94work-on-the-project-completed-so-far-remaining-to-be-completed-by-sep-25-this-year/.
153
Irfan Haider, “PM Nawaz Inaugurates Pak-China Friendship Tunnels Over Attabad Lake,” Dawn, September 14, 2015,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1206911.
154
CPEC Authority, “KKH Thakot-Raikot N35 Remaining Portion,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,
http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/71 (accessed June 7, 2020).
155
Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, “Annual Plan 2019-2020,” Ministry of Planning, Development, and
Reform (2020), https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/annualplan/AnnualPlan2019-20.pdf, pp. 156-158.
156
中国重汽集团与中国港控公司、巴基斯坦瓜达尔港务局正式签署战略合作框架协议 [“China National Heavy
Duty Truck Group Co., Ltd. Officially Signs Strategic Cooperation Framework Agreement with COPHCL and Pakistan’s
Gwadar Port Authority”], 中国重汽集团 [China National Heavy Duty Truck Group], August 14, 2017,
http://www.cnhtc.com.cn/view/NewsDetailPic.aspx?id=394.
157
Lei Yanling et al, “Analysis of the Construction of the China-Pakistan Logistical Corridor”; Naima Saeed and Odd I.
Larsen, “Container Terminal Concessions: A Game Theory Application to the Case of the Ports of Pakistan”; Shibasaki, et
al. “Could Gwadar Port in Pakistan Be a New Gateway?”
158
“Fact Sheet: High Speed Rail Development Worldwide,” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, July 19, 2018,
https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-high-speed-rail-development-worldwide; “China Has Built the World’s
Largest Bullet-train Network,” The Economist, January 13, 2017, https://www.economist.com/china/2017/01/13/chinahas-built-the-worlds-largest-bullet-train-network.
159
铁路助力“一带一路”建设 [“Railways Help the Construction of the Belt and Road”], PRC Ministry of Commerce,
May 25, 2015, http://cafiec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tongjipeixun/201505/20150500983191.shtml.
160
In May 2020, tracklaying began to complete a high-speed railway loop circling the Taklimakan desert. “Tracklaying
starts on southern Xinjiang rail links,” Railway Gazette International, May 21, 2020,
https://www.railwaygazette.com/infrastructure/tracklaying-starts-on-southern-xinjiang-rail-link/56562.article.

27

Figure 5. CPEC official railway plan161
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However, Pakistan’s existing railroad network requires substantial investment since it lacks the
capacity to meet current commercial demand.162 As is the case for most other infrastructure,
Balochistan is worse off than the rest of the country.163 Nonetheless, Gwadar’s rail connectivity has
not yet been a priority for Chinese and Pakistani planners. Current CPEC plans prioritize
improvements to Pakistan’s existing rail network—including at Port Qasim—and postpone plans for
new rail lines to connect Gwadar to the “middle and long term.”164 Pakistani Railway Ministry
officials evidently do not view the costs of connecting Gwadar as worth the expected benefits—
especially not weighed against other priorities.165
For some Pakistani transport analysts, if the goal is to link Gwadar to Central Asian and Chinese
markets, then the port is more likely to be integrated into Iranian rail network to the west.166 The
relative efficiency of the Iranian rail system provides one argument for continuing to delay any major
investment in rail in Balochistan.167 Sanctions on Iran have made this option unattractive, but this
disincentive is not necessarily permanent. As China and Iran explore a more substantial bilateral
relationship, the prospect of circumventing western Pakistan to access Central Asia through Iran may
prove more appealing.168 India’s existing port project at Chabahar and fraying Sino-Indian ties,
however, will make Chinese inroads into Iran’s transport networks more challenging.169
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Some Chinese scholars believe that if Pakistan could connect directly into China’s advanced logistics
networks it could readily “turn Gwadar into China’s exit to the sea.”170 These and other hopeful
suggestions neglect to consider the engineering and security challenges posed by building rail lines
across mountainous and insecure terrain of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan.171 A ChinaPakistan joint railroad group met in summer 2017 to develop these plans, but no progress is visible.
At present there is little realistic prospect of laying down rail connecting China and Pakistan.172
Remarkably, a former senior diplomat at the PRC Embassy in Islamabad pointed out that “a ChinaPakistan railway must always lose money” because of the relative cheapness of maritime shipping
and the prohibitive expense of building and maintaining rail infrastructure.173
Air Transport
Gwadar’s viability as an international transport and trading hub requires air transport. Beginning in
2019, Chinese firms began constructing a “New Gwadar International Airport” to replace the small
facility currently serving Gwadar. This new project is managed by China Airport Construction
Group, directly subordinate to the Civil Aviation Administration of China, a branch of the PRC
Ministry of Transport. Beijing Urban Construction Group Co., Ltd. and China Railway Beijing
Engineering Group Co., Ltd. are contracted to construct the airport. 174
Although the Chinese government converted the original $230 million loan to a grant in 2015,175 it
took four years before construction began at a site 26 km east of Gwadar out in the desert in an area
known as Goran Dani.176 A groundbreaking ceremony was held in March 2019 with Pakistan’s
President Imran Khan in attendance.177 It is designed to be Pakistan’s second largest airport covering
18 square kilometers (6.9 square miles) with a runway more than 12,000 feet (3,658 meters) long—
capable of handling the largest civilian and military aircraft.178
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Image 4. Chinese staff working on the New Gwadar International Airport179

Security and virus containment measures are recent challenges for the airport construction site that
reveal aspects of its development. In May 2020, the head of the Chinese project management group
visited the site in a convoy of military and police vehicles. He said the site resembled a military
facility due to the large presence of military personnel, bunkers, concrete roadblocks, sandbags for
blast proofing, and watch towers. No medical facilities capable of handling the spread of COVID-19
exist. The virus situation has also slowed shipments of construction supplies from Karachi from
weekly to monthly. That the supplies come from Karachi strongly confirms that the nearby port of
Gwadar remains ill-suited to meet even local needs.180
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Once the new airport is operational it will provide a ready connection to China without the manifold
challenges posed by ground transportation. The PRC central government intends to develop
Xinjiang’s aviation sector and its role as a hub for Central and South Asia.181 Chinese analysts
promote an “Aviation Silk Road” and claim that “by building up and expanding airports and aviation
operations in Pakistan’s major cities and along its coast, China can open up an air corridor to the
Indian Ocean.”182 Air transport may augment the commercialization of the port, but its low capacity
and high cost make aviation an unlikely commercial savior.183 It could, however, enable military
logistics that would have otherwise been impossible.
Oil and Gas Infrastructure
For nearly 15 years, China and Pakistan have made announcements of ambitious plans for oil and gas
infrastructure development at Gwadar as detailed below, but to date no oil or gas terminals,
refineries, or pipelines have been built.
• In 2006 Hu Jintao visited with a delegation that signed an MOU for a $12.5 billion Chinese
petrochemical terminal at Gwadar.184
•

In 2015, China Pipeline Petroleum Bureau (a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum
Corporation, one of the three major Chinese national oil companies) agreed to build a 42-inch
diameter pipeline with two compressor stations to handle some 500 million cubic feet per day
from the planned terminal at Gwadar.185 The projected cost of $1.6 billion of both pipeline
and LNG terminal would bring the line as far as Nawabshah to connect with other Pakistani
pipelines; an additional spur to Lahore is planned for another $2 billion.186 These projects
have not yet been approved by Pakistan’s Ministry of Petroleum and Resources.187

•

In 2018, a planned LNG terminal on the north side of the bay was originally due to be
completed, but work on the project was delayed when Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning sought
to lease an FSRU rather than purchasing one outright, as a cost saving measure.188
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•

In 2019, CNPC reportedly considered building an 80km spur connecting Gwadar to the
Iranian border, but persistent sanctions on Iran have prevented development.189
In early 2019, Saudi Arabia stepped in to offer financing and construction for oil facilities near
Gwadar that may displace the long-stalled Chinese project.190 After a trip to Pakistan by Saudi crown
prince Mohammad Bin Salman, the Saudis pledged $10 billion to build a petrochemical refinery
complex in the north bay at Gwadar.191 Chinese firms initially appeared concerned about this Saudi
interest.192 Increasingly, they express cautious optimism about possible Sino-Saudi cooperation to
help Pakistan’s troubled fiscal situation.193 Saudi Arabia, China and the UAE have pledged financing
to keep Pakistan on track in servicing its current IMF bailout loan, providing some evidence of
coordinated Chinese and Saudi support for their struggling partner.194 More recent reports, however,
deal another blow to hopes of developing Gwadar. The Saudis announced they may move the
location of their refinery from Gwadar, where there are no other oil and gas facilities, to Hub, a city
near Karachi.195
Chinese analysts may be coming to terms with the commercial futility of developing Gwadar into a
petrochemical processing hub. The urgency to do so may be diminished, as oil and gas are now piped
from Kyaukphyu, Myanmar to Yunnan province in southwestern China, providing one direct link to
the Indian Ocean (and the subject of a forthcoming case study in this series). Further, the feasibility
and desirability of a Pakistan energy corridor is in doubt. A researcher from the PRC Ministry of
Commerce recently disparaged the so-called “Malacca Dilemma” as a “pseudo-concept,” in part due
to varied needs China would face if there was actually a concerted effort to interdict China’s
maritime energy shipments. Wartime oil demand could be curtailed, and reserves and existing
overland routes could be tapped in the short term.196 In peacetime, the cost of constructing pipelines
and refineries compared to building and operating crude oil carriers makes the maritime route
significantly cheaper and higher capacity, even given the greater distance.197 This research report
for leasing the Floating Storage and Re-gasification Unit (FSRU) for 25 years at an estimated cost of $120,000 per day.
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estimated that the overland transport costs would be 42 percent of the selling price of the oil,
compared to less than 2.5 percent of the price of oil transported by sea.198 While some Chinese
academics unaccountably predict that some 60% of China’s energy needs could be supplied via
pipeline from the Indian Ocean,199 Chinese officials do not consider this remotely realistic.200
Technical analyses of the viability of overland pipelines to supply Chinese energy demand make note
of the capacity limitations inherent in pipelines. Pipelines have a maximum throughput that cannot be
scaled up like seaborne transport. Logistics experts at Dalian Maritime University have analyzed the
cost and reliability of the overall logistical chain, modeling a series of scenarios predicated on
different assumptions about risks to different maritime and land channels. They find that the highest
utilization scenario for Gwadar would provide only six percent of China’s oil imports.201 These
analysts also note the many other seaborne passages for oil and gas, including from the Americas,
Africa, and the Arctic, that could further mitigate the “dilemma” and obviate the need for costly,
risky overland routes.202 Other analysts assess the overland security risks (e,g., from terrorism and
natural disasters) are both more acute and more likely than those affecting the maritime route.203
Power Priorities
The slow pace of linking Gwadar with transport infrastructure is partly a result of those projects
being crowded out by a higher Pakistani priority: power. The majority of the projects listed formally
as “CPEC” concern power generation, mostly in the form of coal fired power plants.204 Power
shortages are the norm in Pakistan, especially in Gwadar, where severe outages—as long as 20 hours
per day—are not unusual. Since 1999, all of Gwadar’s electricity has been imported from Iran.205
There is great demand for stable power that must be met before any more ambitious development can
be carried out.
Power generation is thus among the key Chinese projects around Gwadar. The CCCC began
constructing a $542 million 300mW coal-fired power plant 40 km east of Gwadar on November 4,
2019. Ning Jizhe, the deputy director of China’s lead economic planning group, the National
Development and Reform Commission, attended the groundbreaking ceremony to emphasize China’s
leadership’s focus on projects in line with Pakistani demands.206 Pakistan’s Ministry of Water and
198
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Infrastructure took a long time approving the project in part because the local Baloch government
claimed that 14mW is sufficient for local purposes and the resources would be better spent
elsewhere. The Balochistan Environmental Protection Agency also took several years to authorize
the plant’s construction.207 Despite these delays, Dongfang Electric Corporation reportedly won the
bid to supply two 150mW steam turbine generators for this project in late March 2020.208 With this
large-scale equipment on the way, Gwadar may have ample electricity in the near future.209
Overall Assessment of Transport Infrastructure
While Chinese officials and scholars routinely discuss the prospective transport corridor as though it
were operational, very little modern infrastructure has been built beyond a few roads and the port
itself. This is not atypical of Chinese investment abroad, which is marked by leadership summits with
memorandums of understanding signed, repeated announcements of the same projects, followed by
halting progress.210 Chinese engineers familiar with the project acknowledge “at present, the
hinterland of the port is limited to the neighboring areas.” 211 The lack of high capacity transport
infrastructure greatly limits the potential for Gwadar’s commercial development. The Balochistan
hinterland is insufficient to realize the grand regional ambitions for Gwadar. However, the long-term
nature of China’s interest in Pakistan’s development cautions against ruling out the eventual
development of a viable transport network. Such connectivity is vital to both of Beijing’s central
aims, to create an “exit to the sea” and to develop Pakistan—and through that development, to
promote security and stability in China’s western provinces and near abroad.

Inland Markets & Resources
The resources and markets of Pakistan (and of its neighbors) provide China with linked economic
and security incentives to remain invested in the Gwadar project. The CPEC program, of which
Gwadar is a key instrumentality, is the main vehicle for Chinese commercial activity in Pakistan. To
date, however, that “flagship” initiative has largely focused on power projects without developing the
transport infrastructure that would enable Gwadar to drive broad-based economic development. This
section briefly summarizes the markets and resources that the port and its transport infrastructure
may unlock, exploring Chinese projects inland as well as more recent efforts to trade with landlocked
Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s Limited Commercial Appeal
The Chinese aim to develop Gwadar and its hinterland transport network targets some significant
economic opportunities. Pakistan’s 233 million people make it the world’s fifth most populous
207
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nation.212 This vast human potential is one of the reasons for China’s largesse in Pakistan, and
informs the business case for investment in power and transport infrastructure. PRC Ministry of
Commerce analysts believe that with “early harvest” projects for power generation and transmission
intact, China can help Pakistan to “build a complete industrial sector through international capacity
cooperation and the construction of overseas economic and trade cooperation zones.”213 That is,
China will export its goods and industrial capacity to Pakistani markets once the country has
sufficient infrastructure. This is a heroic aim, and despite the enthusiasm of Chinese promoters, is
privately not considered a high-probability outcome by more sober-minded analysts.214
Pakistan is beset by major problems hindering economic progress. Although its GDP grew at an
annual rate of roughly 5 percent for the period 2013-2018,215 Pakistan suffers from chronic
macroeconomic instability. In mid-2019, Pakistan received its thirteenth IMF bailout in the last thirty
years, 216 this one a $6 billion loan to deal with a persistent balance of payments crisis.217 China’s
CPEC investment evidently has not improved Pakistan’s macroeconomic health.218 Although
Pakistan is the target of growing Chinese investment, Sino-Pakistani bilateral trade remains “tiny and
weak,”219 actually contracting from 2017 to 2018.220
Poor past performance notwithstanding, Pakistan’s young demography and low levels of
urbanization present some attractive growth opportunities.221 In light of China’s growing labor costs
and export tariff burdens to key markets, Pakistan is also attractive as an investment destination
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because of its low tariffs into the American market.222 Chinese trade specialists meanwhile
emphasize the “significant trade complementarities” between imports of Pakistan’s minerals and
agriculture, and exports of China’s consumer goods and technology products.223
Inland Industrial Parks
The CPEC program intends to help Pakistan move up the value chain from commodity exports into
light manufacturing and industry. This development would potentially facilitate “industrial transfer”
from China to Pakistan and creating consumers for Chinese exports.224 During a meeting of the
China-Pakistan Joint Cooperation Committee in December 2016, nine special economic zones were
proposed, each to be established with China’s financial and managerial assistance. These zones
require stable power, water, labor, and administration, and therefore depend upon the success of
“early harvest” projects.225 Many in Pakistan are advocating for a an even larger-scale effort in
industrialization with the creation of 46 special economic zones.226
None of these zones are yet operational, but the official CPEC website currently lists the nine zones
in various stages of planning and development.227 One more mature example with a Chinese investor
and operator is the Rashakai Economic Zone. It is the result of an MOU signed between the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa provincial government and China National Electric Engineering Company in January
2017.228 This zone is meant to eventually cover 1,000 acres and is meant to feature industrial clusters
in garment and textile products, home building materials, general merchandise, electronics and
appliances, automobiles and mechanical equipment.229 It is reportedly the first zone to begin
attracting Chinese business, offering customs relief, ten years of income tax exemption, permission
for full foreign ownership of assets, and other incentives tailored to Chinese investors.230 There are
222
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also special economic zones or industrial parks spanning a variety of industries planned at sites in
Bostan, Islamabad, Faisalabad, the Port Qasim area and elsewhere.231
Balochistan’s Resources

Image 4: Map of Major Mineral Distribution in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.232

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest and poorest province. Its substantial mineral resources present a
tempting commercial opportunity, but political instability and significant security risks have kept
most investors at bay. Chinese firms, however, have invested in Balochistan’s mineral resources
since the 1990s. Chinese analysts note that geologic surveys reveal that Pakistan is not as poorly
endowed with minerals as was once believed, and that there is a great potential for further
development.233 Chinese analysts identify some 40 minerals as abundant in Balochistan.234 Metals
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(especially copper and gold) and natural gas are found largely in Balochistan, while other minerals
like coal are concentrated in central Pakistan.235 Balochistan is the source of nearly 80 percent of
Pakistan’s oil and gas reserves, by some estimates.236 The largest gas field in Pakistan, at Sui in
eastern Balochistan, is past its peak but still active and being developed by Pakistani firms.237
Metallurgical Construction Corporation of China (中国冶金建设集团公司) was one of the earliest
Chinese developers of Pakistan’s mining industry, building the Saindak copper and gold mine in the
1990s, near Pakistan’s border with Iran and Afghanistan. It gained the rights to operate this mine in
late 2001, and has exported copper and other minerals to China. Further to the east, the firm also
established the Duddar lead and zinc mine in November 2008, operated jointly by three Chinese
firms. Both of these projects in Balochistan are tax-exempt.238
However promising the mineral wealth, thus far it has not been successfully exploited and marketed.
Even optimistic Chinese observers concede that a host of issues—security prominently among
them—continue to frustrate Balochistan’s potential.239 The “lack of physical, institutional, and
regulatory infrastructure” in Balochistan means that agriculture, livestock, and fisheries remain the
principal industries in the province.240 Chinese efforts to develop a Gwadar fishing industry may be
mostly an attempt to mollify worsening sentiments among the local population.241 Gwadar Free Zone
Company is pushing for “relevant enterprises” to outfit Gwadar fishermen with upgraded oceangoing fishing vessels and training in their operation on a “partial donation” basis.242 Displaced local
fishermen will be “absorbed” into fish processing and other activities related to their own occupation
once the factories are set up.243
Chinese analysts further lament that “low-grade transportation channels” have so far limited the
exploitation of Balochistan’s mineral wealth.244 Chinese engineers with experience at the port believe
that the effort to connect the port to markets and resources further afield is unlikely to succeed in the
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near term because of long and costly effort required to build transportation infrastructure. 245 Thus
they conclude that industrialization on site at the port and its immediate surroundings is the optimal
development goal, with potential for “petrochemicals, automobile assembly, and construction
material processing…and as conditions mature, gradually expanding to shipbuilding, equipment
manufacturing, and other heavy industries.” The commercial case for developing Gwadar as a means
for accessing Pakistan’s markets and resources, then, is not a powerful one—even among Chinese
advocates.
Other Markets and Resources Beyond Pakistan
Gwadar figures prominently as “the exit to the sea for the five Central Asian countries.”246 Among
these, Afghanistan has been the Central Asian state of most interest. Pakistan has been part of the
regional trade and transport organization, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC)
since 2010 (and China is a founding member). Industry analysts believe that “Pakistani seaports
(Karachi, Bin Qasim and Gwadar) are becoming promising gateways for CA [Central Asia],
including the XUAR [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region], because most cities in CA are closer to
the Pakistani seaports than the ports in Russia, China, Iran, Georgia and the Baltic countries.”247
Gwadar will require extensive development of transport infrastructure to facilitate trade to
landlocked Central Asian states, but this potential broader market is part of its appeal.
Afghanistan is the first, and most proximate, landlocked Central Asian state to see trade from
Gwadar port. In January 2020, Gwadar was officially opened for use under the Afghanistan-Pakistan
Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA).248 This overland transit to landlocked Afghanistan used the N-65
road from Gwadar, one of a small handful of completed CPEC transport infrastructure projects in the
area (see Image 7 below). The first shipment of chemical fertilizer was delivered by a COSCO ship
in January 2020, then trucked up to the border at Chaman in northern Balochistan,249 with subsequent
shipments continuing in May.250 Pakistani officials have been looking to shift NATO cargoes to
Afghanistan from Karachi to Gwadar since at least 2018,251 and Chinese-built infrastructure appears
to be making this a possibility. However, such limited commercial activity at Gwadar port is
demonstrative rather than profit-driven. It enabled officials to highlight the use of local labor and
once again to hold out hope for expansion beyond fertilizers into other bulk cargoes like sugar and
wheat. But at present the enterprise remains quite small in scale.252
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In aggregate, the markets and resources of Pakistan and its Central Asian neighbors are potentially
significant but unlikely to be accessed via Gwadar at scale without much more substantial
investment. Analysts differ on the magnitude of the commercial opportunity and the probability that
the transport networks will make it possible. However, in surveying the Chinese discourse on the
economic purposes of Gwadar port and the broader CPEC endeavor, the most consistent themes are
concerns about security, both internal and external. While PRC reporting on Gwadar and CPEC
dutifully hypes the business case for the projects, nearly all Chinese analysis calls attention to the
abundant risks that attend any development in Pakistan. Chinese officials, businesspeople, and
analysts are actively debating whether Pakistan’s various “non-economic problems” can be overcome
by Chinese capital and expertise.253 Those problems—especially terrorism and political instability—
are even more acute in Balochistan, which must be developed if Gwadar is to thrive.

Figure 6. Six Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridors254
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The Xinjiang Connection
Chinese interest in Pakistan’s economic development becomes more comprehensible when
considered as part of China’s “holistic” outlook on internal and external security policy. Though
Gwadar is distant from the PRC border, it is the essential node linking China’s western regions to the
Indian Ocean. It is therefore vital to the realization of Beijing’s second strategic objective identified
in the introduction to this case study—namely, to secure its periphery and stabilize Xinjiang.
The ambitious PRC development projects underway across Pakistan are recognizable as extensions
of long-standing social and economic development policies in its far-flung western regions, Xinjiang
in particular. Xinjiang is officially designated a “core area” of the BRI because it sits at the heart of
Central Asia’s regional transport networks.255 It is also Beijing’s central concern in two decades of
policy programs to develop the less prosperous western regions of China. Chinese security officials
and analysts believe that terrorism and unrest in Xinjiang is a consequence of its connections to
people, ideas, and resources beyond its borders, especially in Pakistan. China’s continuing efforts to
promote Pakistan’s development thus reflect this first order security priority more so than the highly
uncertain prospects of realizing the touted commercial goals for Gwadar and CPEC. This section first
examines the security threats facing by Chinese businesses operating at Gwadar and Balochistan,
then explores the connections drawn between terrorism and development in Chinese thinking about
its relationship with Pakistan.
Security Risks in Pakistan
The commercial prospects for the Chinese projects at Gwadar are uncertain in significant part
because of the local security situation.256 Terrorism in particular poses a direct threat to Chinese
workers and projects, which have been targeted by Baloch nationalist groups hostile to China’s
presence.257 This risk has not, however, deterred Chinese investment in Pakistan—in fact, perhaps
counterintuitively, it may have spurred increased investment since bringing about a more secure and
stable Pakistan through development is the underlying strategic motivation.
The willingness to invest despite known security costs in Balochistan is not necessarily out of step
with Chinese risk acceptance across the Belt and Road portfolio. Indeed, Chinese outbound
investment concentrates in countries and regions with relatively high levels of security, political, and
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economic risk.258 China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure), the leading Chinese
state-owned insurance firm, rated overall risk for investing in Pakistan at a 7 out 9 (with 9 as the
highest risk), and judged terrorism in the South Asian region overall makes it “one of the most risky
in the world.”259 Nonetheless, China’s officially pledged $62 billion investment in CPEC is the
highest such figure among BRI countries since 2013, and Pakistan has been China’s third largest
target for outbound FDI and construction.260
To manage these risks, Chinese people working across the country are protected by dedicated
security personnel. Pakistan provide a “Special Security Detachment” (SSD) headquartered in
Karachi and Rawalpindi of between 15,000 and 17,000 armed personnel detailed specifically to
protect Chinese nationals and projects.261 Between 3,000 and 5,000 of these have been detailed to
Gwadar262 and the rest to the developed eastern part of the country.263 Chinese analysts have also
urged Chinese firms to hire private security contractors.264 Typically, Chinese personnel and firms
are protected by a mix of military, paramilitary, police, and private security contractors and secure
housing and work areas.265 Most of the security contractors are Pakistani, but the Chinese private
security firm Dewei Security Service Group was reportedly hired to implement security measures at
Gwadar port.266 Enhanced security is evidently required at Gwadar and along the Makran coastal
highway. Visits to Gwadar must be preapproved by the Pakistan Government and military, and
danger along the coastal highway has led Pakistani authorities to prohibit Chinese from taking the
road from Karachi to Gwadar, requiring them to fly instead,267 and as recently as January 2020, the
258
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PRC Ministry of Foreign affairs renewed a standing warning for Chinese citizens not to go to
Balochistan at all.268
Security measures may mitigate the risks, but they do not make Pakistan—Balochistan in
particular—a safe place for commerce. A geospatial analysis of terror attacks in Pakistan by
researchers at China’s People’s Public Security University found the spread of terror attacks in
Balochistan to be worsening over time.269 The PRC government reportedly offered to dedicate an
additional 1 percent of each project to support security costs.270 The port’s free trade zone has better
security than the city itself,271 but even this “green zone” is not immune from terrorist attacks. In
May 2019, Baloch gunmen stormed the only upscale hotel in Gwadar where Chinese business
travelers stay, killing five Pakistanis.272 The Balochistan Liberation Army’s video statement
following the attack was unequivocal: “BLA [forces] will attack Chinese officials and installations in
Balochistan…. The CPEC will fail miserably on the Baloch land. Balochistan will be a graveyard for
your expansionist motives.”273
Perceived Transnational Terrorist Threat to China
Chinese security analysts are fixated by the potential for Pakistan-based terrorism and social
instability to spill over into China. The “Chinese War on Terror” concentrates on Pakistan because its
loosely governed border regions appear to be a major vector for radicalization and training of
Chinese Muslims.274 Pakistan’s security forces have been long-time collaborators with China in its
efforts to eradicate a succession of purported Uyghur terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, beginning as early as the 1990s.275 Domestically, Beijing’s perception of an increased
threat of terrorism has led to a dramatic intensification of its already harsh policies of repression of
Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.276
The transnational element of the perceived terrorist threat—whether accurate or not—evidently
provides powerful impetus to Beijing to pursue aggressive policies in Xinjiang and the countries
bordering it.277 Leading Chinese security officials, like Qin Tian, deputy commander of the
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paramilitary People’s Armed Police, are focused on the Uyghur linkages with terrorist groups and
other “hostile forces” abroad:
In light of the terrorist incidents that occurred in Xinjiang and the way many carried out
planning and command overseas for attacks within our borders, a pattern of collusion has
formed. The terror incidents occurring along the frontier border regions are based out of
transnational terrorist organizations and backed by hostile forces. Foreign terrorist
organizations mainly support [China’s] domestic terrorist organizations in terms of
organization, public opinion, funding, technology, and strategy.278
Terrorist activity in Pakistan and the instability in Xinjiang are therefore intrinsically linked in the
minds of China’s leaders. Xi Jinping’s “holistic security outlook” (总理国家安全观) prescribes
coordination between “the two security situations at home and abroad” and thus carries on a long
tradition in Chinese strategic thought linking internal and external security.279 Applying this
“holistic” approach, Chinese analysts call attention to domestic and international causes and
consequences of the perceived terrorist threat in Xinjiang. Purported terrorist cells in China “use
West Asia as a base camp, Central Asia as a bridgehead, South Asia as a training base, Europe and
the United States as their coordination and command center, and China as the main battlefield.”280
Internal security, in this line of thinking, requires management of external threats. The preferred
mode of managing those threats is through economic development.
The notion that economic development is the “cure” for the “disease” of terrorism is one corollary of
Xi’s prescribed security outlook.281 The view that “economic security is the foundation of holistic
national security” 282 leads China to pursue policies of economic development precisely to manage
Pakistan’s unfavorable security situation. A leading Chinese diplomat and former PRC Ambassador
to Pakistan dismissed the American post-9/11 military approach to counterterrorism as “treating
symptoms but not curing the disease” and prescribing instead “gradual implementation of the
projects of CPEC so that economic and social conditions of the backward areas of both Pakistan and
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China will be improved, and the hotbed of terrorism—poverty—will be gradually reduced.”283
Economic development is often the primary prescription for how to treat the real and imagined
ailments of the Chinese body politic.
Pakistan’s Role in China’s “Develop the West” Campaign
Pakistan is vital to Chinese ambitions to cure the “disease” of terrorism with economic development.
Beijing’s vision to develop and thereby stabilize its far western provinces, especially Xinjiang,
explicitly involves efforts like Gwadar and CPEC. Chinese economic attention to Pakistan should be
understood as part of the gradual development of China’s campaign to develop its western regions,
which have badly lagged the coastal, eastern parts of the country. The desire to develop and stabilize
China’s western provinces explains much of China’s sustained economic program in Pakistan. The
widely publicized Silk Road Economic Belt (i.e., the land “belt” in the Belt and Road) is in many
respects the extension of these domestic stability and development policies. The “Great Western
Development” (西部大开发) or “Go West” (西进) strategy, initiated in 1999, is the domestic
precursor to BRI, and the programs are now intertwined.284
The objective of a stable, prosperous Xinjiang lies at the heart of both programs. China’s leaders
explicitly link Gwadar’s development and the CPEC program to these efforts. When Li Keqiang
announced CPEC in 2013, he stated that China and Pakistan “agreed to establish an interface
between China’s strategy to develop its western region and Pakistan’s domestic economic
development.”285 The former PRC Ambassador to Pakistan, Zhou Gang, explained the impetus for
this linkage:
Pakistan’s security is China’s security…. Pakistan has critical significance for safeguarding
peace and tranquility in China’s Xinjiang Region, steadily advancing the Great Western
Development strategy and the development of friendly relations with Central Asia, South
Asia, and the Gulf countries.”286
The tight coupling of security and development in Xinjiang and Pakistan is plain across official and
scholarly commentary on CPEC.287 Official guidance reinforced this linkage in a May 2020 “Guiding
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Opinion on Promoting Development of the Western Regions in the New Era,” which exhorted
officials to “coordinate the two major issues of development and security, and make better use of the
national security barrier in the western region.”288 That recent authoritative statement also referred to
Xinjiang as a “core region” of the BRI and urged cadres to “accelerate” the “west-facing
transportation hub and trade logistics center.”289 Rebranded in this Guiding Opinion as “Go West,”
China’s domestic western development plans dovetail with their foreign BRI program, with a nexus
in Xinjiang.
China’s domestic priorities further designate Xinjiang a conduit for energy from abroad that bolsters
growth (and promotes security) in western provinces. As one group of scholars put it, “to push
forward China’s Great Western Development strategy we need an ‘exit to the Indian Ocean.”290 This
demand for Xinjiang’s Indian Ocean connectivity was captured in policies such as the 2007 PRC
State Council’s determination that Xinjiang should be an “energy import corridor” to the west.291
This long-held ambition has yet to produce a pipeline through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.292
In summary, the inland markets and resources of Pakistan and neighboring countries present some
theoretically attractive commercial prospects, but these have not borne fruit largely because of the
high costs associated with instability and security risks. In PRC public discourse, despite scattered
dissent,293 the most commonly expressed view is that Pakistan’s development is instead a matter of
PRC “border security.” In the words of two academic analysts, PRC goals in Pakistan are to secure
“stability and prosperity in Pakistan through the participation of Xinjiang, such that China’s antiterrorist barrier and security outpost can maintain its stability on the western frontier, ensuring longterm security in Xinjiang.”294 Beyond securing China’s troubled border areas, however, the prospect
for naval utilization of the port remains a tantalizing possibility.
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Naval & Military Component
Reports of Gwadar’s use as a Chinese naval or military facility are premature.295 The port’s location,
its low commercial utilization, and the close bilateral political-military relationship make it a
perennial favorite for analysts predicting China’s next overseas military base. Yet there have been no
PLA deployments to Gwadar to date, nor even a single observed PLAN port call. The reasons for this
lack of military utilization may outweigh those recommending it. This section first considers the
physical capacity of Gwadar to support PLAN operations, then analyzes its military utilization to
date, and assesses future possibilities for the facility.
Suitability for Hosting PLAN Vessels
From the standpoint of physical capacity, Gwadar could readily be repurposed for use as a PLA
military facility. If no commercial traffic is permitted, the draught (12.5m) and quay wall (602m)
dimensions mean Gwadar’s port facilities could support the PLAN’s largest vessels, such as the
Type-075 amphibious assault ship (LOA 235m, draft 7-8m), Type 071 landing platform dock (LOA
210m, draft 7m), and the Type-901 fleet replenishment ship (LOA 241m, draft 10.8m).296 PLAN
aircraft carriers could also call on Gwadar, though conditions such as tidal variation, wind, and
atmospheric pressure could push depth at the port below PLAN under-keel clearance limitations.297
Any major surface combatant (Type 055 cruisers, Type 052D destroyers, Type 054A frigates) could
berth simultaneously with the carrier. Periodic dredging can manage Gwadar’s siltation issue and
make the port navigable for all PLAN vessels under most conditions.
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Beyond the pier, Gwadar possesses a sizeable laydown yard for marshalling military equipment and
materials. If the free zone adjacent to the terminal fails to attract business, the vacant warehouses,
administrative buildings, and living quarters could be provided for military use. While the PLA could
likely deliver reliable power to such a facility and thus the ships at quay, it may not be necessary if
Dongfang Electric Corporation’s turbine generators are installed in the expected Gwadar Coal Power
Plant. Additionally, bunkering services, water supply, ship chandlery, medical services, and crew
arrangements are among the services reportedly provided by Gwadar Marine Services Limited, a
COPHC subsidiary.298 Especially given low levels of commercial utilization, Gwadar could provide a
number of regular services to naval ships operating in theater without much economic disruption to
the terminal.
Potential Value as a Military Base
Despite sufficient capacity, the PLA has not made use of Gwadar to date. No officials have
commented on why this is the case, nor have Chinese analysts speculated about why the facility has
not been utilized by the navy. However, there are several circumstances under which the PLA might
request and receive access to facilities at Gwadar. These are worth considering in operational terms,
even if they are politically uncertain.
PLAN vessels could stage from Gwadar to operate in and around the Persian Gulf, or to assist in
convoying commercial vessels across the Indian Ocean during times of crisis or conflict. Security
issues and the lack of connectivity with the rest of Pakistan are major obstacles in the commercial
development of Gwadar, but these conditions make for a more secure location from a military
perspective.299 With no significant commercial activity or international presence in Gwadar, PLA
activities could be concealed from foreign observers. Gwadar’s port and airport sites are tightly
guarded compounds, walled off from outsiders and manned with the help of Pakistan forces.300
China’s primary SLOC and first overseas military base in Djibouti are far-flung for the PLAN, and
not supported directly by any other Chinese military facilities. Stronger logistical support in the
northern Indian Ocean would be useful. Running through the South China Sea and across the Indian
Ocean, it takes ten or more days for PLAN task forces to reach the Gulfs of Aden or Oman.301 PLAN
forces are tasked with diverse overseas missions, from humanitarian/disaster relief efforts to the
projection of power to secure overseas interests and citizens.302 However the geographic distances
involved present major problems for equipping and supplying PLAN ships for all contingencies,
especially in urgent situations. Ships will not likely be carrying everything they need when a crisis
arises.
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Prepositioning parts, supplies, and other materials at Gwadar would be a productive use of the
facilities. Such measures would complement other supply points around the region and mitigate the
political risks that one or more might be unavailable at a given time. It would also allow task forces
to optimize their loadouts for more immediate mission requirements. Even a low-footprint
warehousing agreement in Gwadar would provide significant benefit to PLAN forces. Two PLA
Army logistics experts recently recommended flexible overseas prepositioning methods, including
rental or construction agreements with overseas commercial ports and airports to embed such support
amongst commercial operations.303 Additionally, general-use goods could be stored in Gwadar’s
warehouses, freeing up more secure locations such as the underground facilities of the Djibouti
Support Base to store munitions, parts, and other high-end materials.304 Furthermore, Chinese naval
vessels need not go to Gwadar themselves to retrieve stored materials. Merchant vessels contracted
as part of the strategic projection support shipping fleets could provide regular service for the PLAN
to reduce any negative responses from international observers.305 COPHC or any other PRC logistics
provider would be competent in managing prepositioned inventories in Gwadar port’s newly
constructed warehouses. While there is no evidence as yet to demonstrate that the PLAN intends to
use Gwadar as a logistics hub, the possibility bears careful observation. Additionally, COPHC would
be legally bound to render support to PLA overseas operations according to article 38 of the PRC’s
National Defense Transportation Law.306
Similarly, the PLA could make use of Gwadar’s new international airport. The construction of the
East Bay Expressway will provide an improved link between the port terminal and the airport. The
length of the new airport under construction at Gwadar (12,000 feet) and secure housing and medical
facilities on site could accommodate any PLA aircraft. The airfield is within the maximum range of
the Y-20 PLA strategic transport aircraft flying from the Chengdu-Qionglai airbase in western
China.307 It could thus provide a site for these aircraft to land, refuel, and rest their crews, and to
deliver parts, personnel, and combat and support vehicles.

303

Authors are from the PLA Army Logistics University. 刘俊, 段志云 [Liu Jun and Duan Zhiyun], 境外行动中的军事
物流保障研究 [“Military Logistics Support for Overseas Operations”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military
Transportation University], no. 5 (May 2019), p. 61.
304
While not specifically referring to Gwadar, the ideas of warehousing agreements to reduce the load on overseas support
bases is discussed by PLA logistics experts in 李守耕, 陈铁祺, 王丰 [Li Shougeng, Chen Tieqi, and Wang Feng], 战备物
资预置储备模式研究 [“On Preset Reserve Mode for Combat Readiness Material”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of
Military Transportation University], no. 7 (July 2019), p. 60.
305
Anti-piracy escort task forces operating in the Gulf of Aden already use merchant shipping to bring along required
materials or coordinate enterprises in the region to make local purchases. However, they do not have sufficient fixed
infrastructure used for military prepositioning. See 刘俊, 段志云 [Liu Jun and Duan Zhiyun], 境外行动中的军事物流保
障研究 [“Military Logistics Support for Overseas Operations”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation
University], no. 5 (May 2019), p. 60. For more information on the development of strategic projection support force, see
Conor M. Kennedy, “Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection,” CMSI China Maritime Report No. 4 (December 2019),
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/4/.
306
This would include assistance in the replenishment and rest of PLA vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and personnel. See 中华
人民共和国国防交通法 [Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation], 中国人大网
[Npc.gov.cn], September 3, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2016-09/03/content_1996764.htm. For
discussion by PLAN officers of the applicability of the National Defense Transportation Law to overseas port calls, see 高
志文 [Gao Zhiwen], 中国战舰靠国外港口实现一站式服务 中企帮大忙 [“Chinese Warships Rely on Foreign Ports for
One-Stop Service”], 中国军事网 [China Military Online], September 30, 2016,
https://mil.sohu.com/20160930/n469427123.shtml.
307
Chad Peltier, “China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations,” Jane’s, April 15, 2020,
https://www.uscc.gov/files/001301, p. 30.

50

Further, the airfield could allow inflow of Chinese military forces to the region. Indeed, the head of
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Transport and Delivery Bureau noted in 2017 the improving conditions
of overseas ground support from overseas agents and Chinese enterprises. He recommended greater
use of their services to support aircraft overseas through bidding and contractual agreements.308
Another officer in his bureau sees the construction of airports along the Belt and Road as a great
opportunity to strengthen China’s overseas aviation projection capabilities.309 The PLA lacks fixedwing support capabilities at its support base in Djibouti, increasing the possibility that Gwadar may
someday be used for China’s growing strategic lift fleet of Y-20s.310
Indeed, for these reasons many PLA analysts consider Gwadar to be a suitable site for military
support. Several PLA authors noted in 2015 that under COPHC’s lease the port could “absolutely”
become a long-term rest and replenishment point for PLAN escort task forces.311 Other PLA experts
find Gwadar to be an obvious choice for establishing an overseas strategic strongpoint, owing to its
geographic location, military importance, and Chinese port operator.312 Some state outright that the
PLA is exploring the construction of a support base in Gwadar.313 Other Chinese military observers
believe PLA access to Gwadar is as good as established. One PLA officer said of the PLAN’s option
for using Gwadar as a base, “The food is already on the plate; we’ll eat it whenever we want to.”314
Pakistan Navy Utilization of Gwadar
Capacity for berthing warships and meeting logistics requirements only establishes conditions of
possibility. It tells us very little about how the facility is likely to be employed. One Pakistani Navy
(PN) officer hopes “China would also deploy its naval ships in coordination with Pakistan Navy to
safeguard the port and trade under the CPEC.”315 This raises the possibility of a combined facility
used by both militaries. The actual PN utilization gives us some sense of the current naval and
military utility of Gwadar and indicates areas where such cooperation might occur.
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In the absence of commercial activity, Gwadar port’s operations appear to be dominated by the
PN.316 The PN prizes Gwadar port because its distance from the Indian border provides a degree of
strategic depth that Karachi does not enjoy.317 Gwadar is home to the small Pakistan Naval Station
Akram, established in 1987 as a depot for naval detachments.318 PNS Akram occupies a large amount
of land on the peninsula’s cliffs, with only a small pier on the far east end of the Gwadar peninsula. It
also serves as a surveillance station, part of Pakistan’s network for monitoring the North Arabian
Sea.319 Further, a 500-man 3rd Marine Battalion was commissioned in March 2013 and is stationed in
Gwadar to provide security for the port and its operations.320
While Gwadar port is a commercial venture, a 2016 Pakistan Senate briefing by deputy chief of naval
staff for operations reports that the facility offers the PN “substantial operational flexibility.”
According to the report, the PN has been given 600 meters of berthing space at the port and the
establishment of a naval base at Gwadar is “high on priority.”321 This means the entirety of the
Gwadar terminal’s current frontage is available for the use by the PN.
Accordingly, Pakistan’s naval forces are making extensive use of the facility. PN Task Force-88 was
established in December 2016 to secure the sea lanes and maritime areas around Gwadar. It
comprises ships, fast-attack craft, aircraft, drones, and other surveillance assets.322 From February
2019 through April 2020, Pakistan Navy vessels called at the port every month an average of three
times.323 In a third of these port calls, at least one of the 2,500 ton, Chinese-built F-22P “Zulfiqar”
frigates was among the vessels at the pier.324 These vessels are export versions of the PLAN’s Type-
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053H3 frigate, which Chinese defense experts consider essential to Pakistan’s ability to operate in the
Indian Ocean in light of India’s superior naval forces.325
The PN has also increased land acquisitions and augmented its presence in the Gwadar district,
indicating greater Pakistan military entrenchment in Balochistan.326 Some suggest this expansion into
Balochistan is part of Pakistan’s Regional Maritime Security Patrol initiative, meant to enhance
maritime security in the Arabian Sea and wider Indian Ocean region and boost Pakistan’s role in
securing the critical sea lanes in its neighborhood. 327
The need for Chinese technical expertise to operate and service the PN will likely increase. In
addition to the four F-22P frigates delivered between 2009 and 2013, the PN entered into a contract
with China Shipbuilding Trading Company Ltd. in 2018 to deliver four Type-054A frigates by 2021.
Ships developed with Chinese technical assistance account for the bulk of the PN’s surface fleet and
the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency’s vessels.328 Technicians from China State Shipbuilding
Corporation are often present in Karachi to provide assistance, and regular flights between Karachi
and Gwadar mean these experts could be on site with little notice.329 Chinese technical expertise is
already important to the PN, but will grow even more so after delivery of the eight contracted S-20
conventional submarines (export variant of the Yuan-class). An agreement reached in 2015 stipulates
delivery of four hulls built in China between mid-2022 and 2023 with the remaining four to be
constructed at the Karachi shipyard by 2028.330
Because China and Pakistan maintain close technical connections, it is possible PLAN ships may
make technical stops at Gwadar to receive parts and take advantage of resident Chinese technical
expertise.331 COPHC is legally obligated to provide for the supply and rest of PLA forces, and
controls all operations and services at the port.332 There is also some scope for the PLA to exercise or
325
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patrol with the PN in maritime security operations in and around the Gulf, as well as to share
intelligence and surveillance data collected from the station at PNS Akram. However, the absence of
PLAN at Gwadar despite these opportunities is an important (but not permanent) observation.
The Preferred Karachi Alternative
To date, the PLAN has preferred the established well-developed facilities of the port of Karachi.
Chinese naval vessels visiting Pakistan have so far exclusively made port and replenishment calls
there, and with some regularity (see Appendix).333 The commercial port at Karachi can satisfy PLAN
replenishment requirements and serve among several of other preferred resupply locations that
enable PLAN operations in the Indian Ocean.334 China’s 2nd Anti-Piracy Escort Task Force (ETF)
conducted a friendly visit to Karachi in August 2009.335 Other ETFs have visited Karachi in the years
since (see Appendix), although Oman, Djibouti, and Saudi Arabia are the sites of more frequent port
calls for PLAN rest and replenishment.336
The PLAN typically visits Karachi for diplomacy and joint exercises. It consistently participates in
the Pakistan-hosted “Aman” series of multilateral exercises, which feature participating ships and
observers from numerous nations.337 More recently, the Southern Theater Command Navy sent four
ships to the China-Pakistan nine-day bilateral exercise “Sea Guardians-2020,” held for the first time
in Karachi.338 Sea-based exercises in the northern Arabian Sea included formation maneuver, joint
patrol, air-defense, maritime interdiction, joint anti-submarine warfare, live-fire drills, and joint
marine corps training. The PLAN provided overall direction for the exercise, taking the lead in
efforts to improve organization and command and control for combined missions.339 Such exercises
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demonstrate a substantial degree of cooperation between the PLAN and PN, providing some
confidence that Gwadar might also be used by the PLAN, alone or in combination with the PN.

Image 5: Liugongdao submarine tender and Weishanhu replenishment ship at Karachi during “Sea Guardians-2020” exercise

Karachi’s proximity to India make it less desirable to some Chinese analysts.340 However, the PLAN
continues to make extensive use of it even with a functioning port at Gwadar. China State
Shipbuilding Corporation personnel in Karachi have provided unspecified “equipment repair
services” to PLAN escort forces in port.341 Other reports also find that PLAN submarines conduct
stops in Karachi, with at least one occurring in May 2015, although specific submarine port calls are
difficult to confirm through open sources. PLAN submarine activities in the region cause significant
consternation in India.342 Such sensitivities may impose significant restraints on building reliable
overseas logistics support for PLAN submarines, although Pakistan could conceivably do so.343 This
broader question would require political decisions in Beijing and Islamabad, and consideration not
only of Indian sensibilities, but those of extra-regional powers like the United States.
Because Pakistan is such a close security partner with China, and so dependent on Chinese good will
for its economic and military development, it is not far-fetched to expect that Pakistan would
welcome more substantial PLA use of the facility under some conditions. Still, the most critical
factor limiting the basing option at Gwadar (or Karachi, Jiwani, or elsewhere in Pakistan) is the
apparent lack of political commitment between China and Pakistan to provide mutual military
340
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support during times of crisis or conflict. More likely in the short- to medium-term is a fuller
realization of the dual-use potential of the facility. If the transport infrastructure projects mature,
Gwadar could become a key peace time replenishment or transfer point for PLA equipment and
personnel.344 But establishment of a base from which the PLAN could undertake naval operations
throughout the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean during periods of conflict is unlikely. Ultimately,
the militarization of China’s Gwadar port facility requires a strategic decision in both Beijing and
Islamabad that will not come without significant trade-offs.

Conclusion
Gwadar will not inevitably become a PLAN base. The strategic strongpoint concept, however,
recommends serious consideration of the site’s potential military utility for China. That is, Gwadar
will continue as a commercial facility operated by a state-owned Chinese firm that can make
arrangements for military use: guaranteed pier space, fuel and supplies, and perhaps even munitions
and some level of technical support for the PLAN fleet and personnel. In this model, China’s aims to
put its best foot forward—namely, the huge scale of trade, investment, finance, and construction that
its government and state-owned enterprises can deliver in concert. This substantial economic
footprint is meant to develop and secure Pakistan for China’s benefit. By leading with commercial
presence, China aims to create permissive conditions for political decisions that could support
military utilization of the port and its surrounding infrastructure.
Such arrangements are uniquely suited to Pakistan, which is reasonably considered a most-likely
candidate for China’s next military base. Pakistan is after all distinguished by its long-standing
strategic alignment with China, growing dependence on Chinese trade and investment, extraordinary
reliance on Chinese weapons sales, and close military and intelligence cooperation with the PLA.345
However, Pakistan is not a Chinese ally. China has never intervened on Pakistan’s behalf in its serial
conflicts with India, and evidently prefers to provide Pakistan with only sufficient capability and
diplomatic cover to take care of its own affairs.346 Thus, mutual political commitment between the
two countries that would allow for PLA basing in times of conflict cannot be assumed.
Managing China’s relationship with India (however strained it is at present) is a high priority for
Beijing—arguably higher than any other in the region, including Pakistan. Chinese leaders will not
sacrifice that crucial bilateral relationship for the sake of a single military facility, and will carefully
consider first- and second-order effects that would certainly result from a more overtly militarized
PRC posture in Pakistan. As a former counsellor to the PRC Embassy in Pakistan put it, “if China
builds a military base in Gwadar, no matter whether or not it signs a treaty, it will essentially form an
alliance with it…this runs counter to our South Asia policy for the last 30 years.”347 It would indeed
be an extraordinary change to China’s diplomacy in the region to decide that it prefers marginal
improvement in its naval posture in the region to a stable relationship with India.
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Drawing primarily on the official and academic discourse in China, this case study has focused on
how Chinese experts understand the value of investing in a strategic strongpoint at Gwadar. We
identify two distinct but converging objectives, one largely internal, the other external. The first,
internal objective is arguably the most urgent and proximate explanation for China’s largesse in
Pakistan. That is, Beijing hopes to stabilize Xinjiang province by providing security and development
in neighboring Pakistan. Gwadar is an anchor for this ambitious development program for Pakistan,
CPEC. PRC officials and analysts view peripheral security as fundamental to internal stability,
drawing on a “holistic national security concept” with deep provenance in Chinese thinking on
managing its frontiers. Nominally economic programs like the “Great Western Development” (and
its rebranding as “Go West”), the “Belt and Road Initiative,” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk
Road” all manifest this internal-external orientation, and require that both Xinjiang and its peripheral
areas remain stable, secure conduits for China’s relations with the rest of the Eurasian continent.
The second objective, largely external, is to ensure reliable access to the Persian Gulf to support
energy flows and a strategic presence in the Middle East and across the Indian Ocean region. Gwadar
has major geographic appeal as an “exit to the ocean” because Pakistan is contiguous to western
China and can, in theory, provide a secure logistical corridor to the sea. Only Myanmar and India
likewise share borders with China as well as the Indian Ocean. The key limitations on realization of
this objective are the insecurity, instability, and underdevelopment of Gwadar and Balochistan.
China’s efforts to build transport infrastructure are proceeding, albeit at a glacial pace. Road, rail, and
pipeline connections require political stability and a level of security that has proved unattainable in
Pakistan. This situation should not be expected to change quickly, if at all. While the untapped inland
markets and resources of Pakistan and Central Asia may provide some real incentive for
consolidating these transport links, the COVID-19 pandemic, continued Pakistani macroeconomic
instability, and China’s domestic economic slowdown combine to recommend a healthy dose of
skepticism that these lofty economic purposes will be achieved.
Despite these challenges, Gwadar need not be a major commercial hub to help anchor China’s
military, political, and economic presence in the Indian Ocean region. Its potency as a geopolitical
instrument, however, comes with significant opportunity costs. Pakistan’s neighbor and rival, India,
is hostile to China’s expanding presence in the region. Especially with the existing strains on the
Sino-Indian relationship due to their border disputes, a “second front” is sure to drive India to more
aggressive balancing against Chinese power in the Indian Ocean region. The more India feels
threatened by Chinese presence in the region, the more attractive the United States becomes as a
security partner for historically unaligned India. Beijing may not believe that India is likely to join an
alliance with Western nations, but the rapid decay of that major bilateral relationship would greatly
complicate China’s overall posture in the Indian Ocean region.
These wider considerations hardly rule out the possibility of a more assertive and militarized Chinese
presence at Gwadar. They do, however, establish hard trade-offs for Chinese strategists considering
the net gains that Beijing would reap from a Gwadar military venture. If China-India and China-US
relations continue to deteriorate rapidly, China may well determine that a confrontational posture is
inevitable. In this case, overt militarization of China’s presence at Gwadar—perhaps in response to a
terrorist incident or a threat in the Strait of Hormuz—might look appealing, even if it provoked harsh
counter-measures. If, however, China is seeking to stabilize the precipitous decline in those
geopolitical relationships, the internal and external security concerns analyzed here should win out.
We would then expect to see China’s continued pursuit of Gwadar’s comprehensive development as
a strategic strongpoint in the Indian Ocean.
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Appendix. PLAN Port Calls to Karachi:
Date

Mission

Vessels

8 December 1985

Friendly visit

Type-051 destroyer Hefei and Type-905 replenishment
ship Fengcang

November 1993

Friendly visit

Type-679 training ship Zhenghe

20 May 2001

Friendly visit

Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin and Type-905
replenishment ship Taicang

21 November 2005

Friendly visit/joint exercise

Type-051B destroyer Shenzhen and Type-903
replenishment ship Weishanhu

5 March 2007

Multilateral exercise “Aman-07”

Type-053H3 frigates Lianyungang and Sanming

21 February 2009

Multilateral exercise “Aman-09”

Type-052B destroyer Guangzhou

5 August 2009

2nd Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/friendly visit

Type-054A frigate Huangshan and Type-903
replenishment ship Weishanhu

24 February 2011

8th Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/multilateral exercise “Aman2011”

Type-054 frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan

8 September 2012

12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/rest
and resupply

Type-054A frigate Yiyang

15 September 2012

12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/
rest and resupply

Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu

22 September 2012

12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/rest
and resupply

Type-054A frigate Changzhou

3 March 2013

14th Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/multilateral exercise “Aman2013”

Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin, Type-053H3 frigate
Mianyang, Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

29 July 2013

“Harmonious Mission-2013”

Type-920 hospital ship Peace Ark

27 September 2014

17th Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/friendly visit/joint exercises

Type-052C destroyer Changchun and Type-054A
frigate Changzhou

22 May 2015

Rest and resupply

Type-039B conventional attack submarine No. 335

7 January 2016

21st Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/friendly visit/joint exercises

Type-908 replenishment ship Qinghaihu, Type-054A
frigate Liuzhou, and Type-054A frigate Sanya

15 November 2016

Joint exercises

Type-054A frigate Handan

14 February 2017

24th Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/multilateral exercise “Aman-17”

Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin, Type-054A frigate
Handan, Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu

10 June 2017

Task Force 150 friendly visit/joint
exercises

Type-052C destroyer Changchun, Type-054A frigate
Jingzhou, and Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu

30 November 2017

Joint exercise “Friend-2017”

Type-054A frigate Jingzhou

7 February 2019

31st Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/multilateral exercise “Aman-19”

Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan and
Type-903A replenishment ship Luomahu

4 January 2020

Bilateral exercise “Sea Guardians2020”

Type-052D destroyer Yinchuan, Type-054A frigate
Yuncheng, Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu,
and Type-926 submarine support ship Liugongdao
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